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INTIRATEXTUALISM
Akhil Reed Amar
The full meaning of the Constitution's text often eludes textualists. By viewing the
document's clauses in splendid isolation from each other - by reducing a single text to a
jumble of disconnected clauses - readers may miss the significance of larger patterns of
meaning at work. One underappreciated antidote to this brand of clause-bound
textualism is an interpretive technique that Professor Amar calls intratextualism.
Intratextualists read a word or phrase in a given clause by self-consciously comparing
and contrasting it to identical or similar words or phrases elsewhere in the Constitution.
Writing in the spirit of Charles Black's Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Law, Professor Amar urges interpreters to read the Constitution more holistically,
illustrating his distinctive technique with a series of rich readings of canonical and
contested cases.
-Interpreters squeeze meaning from the Constitution through a variety
of techniques - by parsing the text of a given clause, by mining the
Constitution's history, by deducing entailments of the institutional
structure it outlines, by weighing the practicalities of proposed read-
ings of it, by appealing to judicial cases decided under it, and by in-
voking the American ideals it embraces. Each of these classic tech-
niques extracts meaning from some significant feature of the
Constitution - its organization into distinct and carefully worded
clauses, its embedment in history, its attention to institutional architec-
ture, its plain aim to make good sense in the real world, its provision
for judicial review (and thus judicial doctrine), and its effort to em-
body the ethos of the American people. Here is another feature of the
Constitution: various words and phrases recur in the document. This
feature gives interpreters yet another set of clues as they search for
constitutional meaning and gives rise to yet another rich technique of
constitutional interpretation. I call this technique intratextualism.
In deploying this technique, the interpreter tries to read a contested
word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another
passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word
or phrase. For example, few constitutional issues have been more sig-
nificant, or more hotly debated, over the last year than the constitu-
tional status of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. Constitutionally
speaking, the Independent Counsel must be an "inferior" officer under
the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2. But what exactly
does "inferior" mean here? To whom exactly is Counsel Starr "infe-
rior"? An intratextual analysis would look to two other clauses of the
Constitution that use the word "inferior" - the Article I, Section 8
clause concerning "inferior" tribunals, and the Article III, Section i
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clause concerning "inferior" courts - for guidance in understanding
the constitutional concept of "inferior."
In what follows, I illustrate, critique, and apply the classic but un-
derappreciated technique of intratextualism across a wide range of
constitutional questions.'
I. CASES AND COMMENTARIES
Intratextualism exists as an important form of constitutional argu-
ment bearing a distinguished legal pedigree, as is clear from a selective
survey of canonical constitutional cases and commentaries. After ex-
amining the use (and nonuse) of the technique in landmark judicial
opinions and scholarly works, we will be poised to ponder some of its
distinctive features. By confining this survey to what are generally
deemed the most canonical cases and commentaries, I aim to avoid
stacking the deck. Instead of picking and choosing only those works
from the last two centuries that show intratextualism at its best and
most powerful, I seek to discover how universal the technique might
be, to assess its pervasiveness as well as its power, to canvass instances
in which it was used passingly or poorly along with those in which it
was used emphatically or well. After we have seen a wide variety of
its uses, abuses, and nonuses, we will be better positioned to theorize
about what we have seen (in Part II) and to consider how powerful the
technique can be at its best (in Part III).
A. Cases
i. McCulloch. - Let us begin with what many would deem the
most central case in our constitutional canon: McCulloch v. Maryland.2
McCulloch's claim to primacy can of course be challenged - Mar-
bury,3 Brown,4 and Roe- probably stand as the three other leading
contenders today, and so we shall eventually consider each of these
three as well.6  Together these four cases mark the basic outlines of
I A more detailed roadmap may be helpful here. Part I illustrates intratextualism by survey-
ing landmark cases and commentaries for traces of this technique in various forms. Part II cri-
tiques intratextualism by comparing and contrasting it to other modes of interpretation, and by
candidly assessing the general strengths and weaknesses of this technique and its variations. Part
III applies intratextualism by using it to rethink three of the most important and most challenging
constitutional questions that have arisen over the last decade - an exercise designed to show how
powerful and elegant the technique can be when used well.
2 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
4 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (i954).
5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 A couple of other possible candidates are New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and I shall also offer a few passing thoughts
about these cases. A superb general discussion of canonicity in constitutional law may be found
in J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, ii HARV. L. REv. 964
(1998). Specific evidence supporting my particular selection of canonical cases today may also be
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conventional constitutional doctrine, characterized by judicial review
of both legislative and executive action (Marbury); broad but theoreti-
cally finite federal power (McCulloch) that states may not obstruct
(McCulloch, again, along with its cousin, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee7 );
emphatic norms against governmental efforts to subordinate or stigma-
tize racial minorities (Brown and its companion Bolling8); and broad
protection of judicially defined fundamental rights that may or may
not be clearly stated in constitutional text (Roe). McCulloch's claim to
canonical primacy, however, rests on more than its doubly significant
substance affirming generous congressional power in the first half of
the opinion and important limits on state governments in the second
half. Perhaps uniquely among the four top contenders, McCulloch
commands our attention not merely for what it says but for how it
says, featuring a richer mixture of elegant constitutional arguments of
various types than its rivals. To read McCulloch is to see (and for
many beginning students, to learn) how to do constitutional argument.
(a) McCulloch and constitutional argument generally. - Before we
examine McCulloch's use of intratextual argument, it may be useful to
review how Chief Justice Marshall's masterpiece deploys other, more
familiar, types of constitutional argument. 9 Consider first an argument
exemplifying textualism in its classic clause-bound form. Maryland
apparently claimed that the Necessary and Proper Clause, "though in
terms a grant of power, is not so in effect; but is really restrictive," re-
quiring the Court to construe the various enumerated powers in Arti-
cle I more strictly than it otherwise would in the absence of this
clause.' 0 In response to this claim, Marshall trumpets the text. Had
the clause been designed to restrict rather than to enlarge or to con-
firm11 the broad construction otherwise appropriate for enumerated
powers, its text would have been worded differently. Instead of af-
found in this essay. See id. at 973-75 & n.43 (identifying the handful of cases that appear in all or
virtually all major constitutional casebooks).
7 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). Because of the towering importance of Martin in its own
right, and alongside McCulloch, we shall closely examine Story's landmark precursor to Mar-
shall's masterpiece.
8 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (I954).
9 For a brilliant general discussion of these argument types, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
10 McCulloch v. Maryland, I7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 42 (1819).
11 Note that, contrary to what many seem to think, Marshall does not claim that the Necessary
and Proper Clause adds anything to congressional power or constitutes some free-standing font of
federal authority; rather, he claims only that the clause does not diminish congressional powers
conferred elsewhere in Article I. In the end, he professes to be agnostic whether the clause was
designed to "enlarge" - or instead merely to confirm and "remove all doubts" about - the
breadth of enumerated power conferred by earlier clauses. Id. at 42o-2 I. The declaratory, doubt-
removing reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause finds strong support in THE FEDERALIST
No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) and No. 44 (James Madison). For more discussion, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. (forthcoming
1999) [hereinafter Amar, Clarifying Clauses].
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firmatively declaring that "Congress shall have the power ... to make j
all laws which shall be necessary and proper,"'1 2 the clause would have
been negatively written "in terms resembling these[:] . . . 'no laws shall
be passed but such as are necessary and proper.' Had the intention
been to make this clause restrictive, it would unquestionably have
been so in [grammatical and syntactical] form as well as in effect."'
3
Marshall buttresses this narrow textual argument with a narrow
historical argument. The friends of the Constitution in 1787, he notes,
faced their main opposition from localists fighting the proposed federal
government as too strong, not from ultranationalists attacking the new
central regime as too weak.14 Had the Framers designed the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause as a restriction on Congress, they would have
openly advertised it as such to win their critics over: "No reason has
been, or can be assigned for... concealing an intention to narrow the
discretion of the national legislature under words which purport to
enlarge it."' 5 Other passages in McCulloch also feature important his-
torical arguments. For example, Marshall opens his substantive analy-
sis of congressional power with a broad-brush narrative of the process
by which the American people ordained and established the Constitu-
tion. 16 A few paragraphs later, Marshall notes that even the Tenth
Amendment does not limit Congress to powers "expressly" conferred,
and he again turns to history for explanation: "The men who drew and
adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments result-
ing from the insertion of this word ['expressly'] in the articles of con-
federation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments."
17
Intertwined with Marshall's appeals to text and history are sturdy
structural arguments rooted in federalism and populism. Because the
Constitution is not merely a league or treaty between sovereign states,
federal powers should not be grudgingly construed, as were the powers
conferred by the earlier Articles of Confederation. (Here we see the
relevance of Marshall's broad-brush narrative of the Founding process,
aimed at disproving the notion that the Constitution was in effect a
mere compact created by sovereign governments.) Because the Consti-
tution derives directly from the people, in whose name it speaks ("We,
the People') and to whom it speaks, it must speak in broad terms. By
its very nature as a populist document, a constitution cannot "partake
of the prolixity of a legal code" - for such a code "would probably
never be understood by the public" whose assent makes a constitution
the supreme law. 8 Thus Marshall argues that the nature of the
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 420.
14 See id.
is Id.
16 See id. at 402-05.
17 Id. at 4o6-07.
18 Id. at 407.
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document repels the idea that every conceivable federal power - such
as the power to create a bank - must be spelled out in minute detail
rather than implied by and subsumed within the general structure of
broadly crafted enumerated powers. Perhaps certain treaties should be
strictly construed in a manner leaving nothing to implication - and so
too perhaps for some legal codes. But for reasons of federalism and
populism, Marshall is emphatic that the document at hand is inher-
ently different from a treaty or a code: "we must never forget, that it is
a constitution we are expounding." 19 Structural arguments also loom
large in the second half of McCulloch, in which Marshall proclaims
that Maryland may not tax the charter of a lawfully established federal
bank. Where, a critic might ask, does the Constitution say that? No-
where in so many words, Marshall cheerfully admits, 20 but as a matter
of general structural logic, surely the part cannot control the whole.
Surely Maryland may not tax those whom Maryland does not repre-
sent. If Maryland may lawfully tax the federal bank a little, surely she
may lawfully tax the federal bank a lot; if she may tax a federal bank,
surely she may tax all other federal instrumentalities; if she may pass
tax laws, surely she may pass other obstructing laws.2 1 This structural
logic nicely echoes the rallying cries of the American Revolution: "No
taxation without representation!" and "No tax on tea!" (To the colonial
patriots, the power of Parliament to pass a tiny tea tax implied the
power to tax without limit, which in turn implied plenary parliamen-
tary power in America.)
McCulloch also illustrates how structural argument often goes hand
in hand with a certain kind of pragmatic argument.2 2 Stingy construc-
tion of the Constitution, Marshall argues, would offend the nature of
the Constitution not merely as a suitably nationalist and populist
document, but also as an inherently practical document. The Consti-
tution was meant to work -- and to work over long stretches of time,
and vast reaches of space:
[A] constitution [is] intended to endure for ages to come, and, conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have pre-
scribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute
19 Id.
20 See id. at 426. Marshall's words here are memorable:
There is no express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a principle
which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which
compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of
being separated from it, without rending it into shreds.
Id.
21 See id. at 426-33.
22 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
22 (1969) (stating that to succeed, structural argument "has to make sense - current, practical
sense"); BOBBITT, supra note 9, at 74 (stating that structural arguments often "embody a macro-
scopic prudentialism drawing not on the peculiar facts of the case but rather arising from general
assertions about power and social choice").
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its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the in-
strument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an
unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if
forseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided
for as they occur.... [The restrictive approach is] so pernicious in its op-
eration that we shall be compelled to discard it ....
The baneful influence of this narrow construction on all the operations
of the government, and the absolute impracticability of maintaining it
without rendering the government incompetent to its great objects, might
be illustrated by numerous examples .... 23
Hear the voice of the pragmatist, weighing various readings by their
consequences. For Marshall, the key fact for the case at hand is the
huge sweep of the nation, ranging "from the St. Croix to the Gulph of
Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.124 Armies may be required to
defend such an immense expanse, and soldiers must be paid wherever
they may go. (As a Revolutionary War veteran who endured the win-
ter at Valley Forge, Marshall viscerally understood the obvious practi-
cal importance of keeping soldiers well supplied and well paid, lest
they desert or mutiny.) A highly convenient way to assure that federal
soldiers will be paid on time and on site is to establish a system of fed-
eral banks with branches stretching across the continent. Because the
Constitution plainly contemplates a federal army and federal fiscal op-
erations of taxing and spending, federal ATMs (or their nineteenth-
century equivalent) are appropriate - they are subsumed within and
implied by the great powers of "[t]he sword and the purse" to tax,
spend, regulate commerce, declare war, and raise and support armed
forces.
2-
Let us now turn to another form of constitutional analysis: doc-
trinal argument, based on judicial precedent. Many readers have no-
ticed that Marshall cites no cases by name. However, in the first para-
graph of his analysis of the first question in the case, Marshall reminds
us that "the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy," has re-
peatedly treated the statute creating a federal bank as "a law of un-
doubted obligation."26 A casual reader might wonder what Marshall
means here, but the answer is clear from McCulloch's oral argument.
27
Judges in earlier cases had upheld criminal convictions for various
frauds upon the bank, actions that would arguably have been immune
from criminal sanction if the bank itself were an unconstitutional en-
23 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415-I8 (emphasis altered).
24 Id. at 4o8.
25 Id. at 407-08.
26 Id. at 4OI.




tity. Why did Marshall soft pedal these precedents? Perhaps because
the constitutionality of the bank was never explicitly raised as a de-
fense in these earlier criminal cases. A good doctrinal judge pays ex-
quisite attention to fine doctrinal distinctions between square holdings
and less than square ones, and between holdings and dicta. When
seen in this light, Marshall's handling of caselaw in McCulloch seems
not cavalier, but deft - ever so softly invoking precedents that, as
precedents go, were ever so soft. Later in his opinion, Marshall again
shows his sensitivity to the dictates of doctrinal argument, this time as
a precedent-setter rather than a precedent-follower. The rule to be
laid down in the case at bar must be capable of being followed by
lower courts and a later Court. Awkward attempts to judicially meas-
ure the precise degree of a law's pragmatic necessity should be
avoided. They will not work, doctrinally, and will make judges look
silly, as would efforts to draw principled doctrinal lines between small
taxes that are permissible and large ones that are not. Legislators may
be free to draw ad hoc lines, but doctrinally minded judges must re-
spect the limits of principled adjudication and attend to the issue of
justiciability:
[T]o undertake here to inquire into the degree of [an appropriate law's]
necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial de-
partment, and to tread on legislative ground.
2 8
We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judi-
cial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what
degree may amount to the abuse of the power.
2 9
Text, history, structure, prudence, and doctrine - these are the ba-
sic building blocks of conventional constitutional argument. But
Philip Bobbitt suggests that a sixth form of constitutional argument
exists and merits attention -- what he calls "ethical argument. '30 By
"ethical," Bobbitt has in mind not an argument from morality pure
and simple, but an argument from the ethos, or character, of the
American people and the American experience. In the vernacular, an
ethical argument might declare a practice unconstitutional because it is
"unAmerican," or might affirm the constitutionality of a contested
practice because it is part of "the American way." We have already
encountered an argument in McCulloch that might be seen as ethical:
the idea of "no taxation without representation" is basic to the Ameri-
can identity and the American experience. 3 1 Additional traces of ethi-
28 Id. at 423 (opinion of the Court) (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
30 BOBBITT, supra note 9, at 93-II9.
31 This argument might also be deemed structural, focusing on the relationship between the
electors and the elected. We the voters have confidence in our representatives and let them tax us
precisely because we chose to vote them in and can choose to vote them out (a fact that concen-
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cal argument surface earlier in Marshall's exposition. He opens his
opinion by reminding us that the i79i bill creating the first bank was
supported by "minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can
boast."32 The reference here is to the sainted Washington, who added
his name to the bill and thus made it law only after satisfying himself
of its constitutionality. To contest this three decades later, Marshall
hints, is to stain the name of our First Man - to be, if not unAmeri-
can, at least unWashingtonian. If this rhetorical gesture strikes us as
too personal to qualify as a proper ethical argument, Marshall later of-
fers up another ode to the American experience that rings more true to
modern ears, attuned as we are to an even more graceful expression of
the same ethical argument some twoscore years later. "The govern-
ment of the Union," says Marshall, "is, emphatically, and truly, a gov-
ernment of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly
on them, and for their benefit."33 As a lawyer named Lincoln would
distill Marshall's ethical point at a place called Gettysburg, America's
is a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
'34
(b) McCulloch and intratextualism. - So much then for McCul-
lock's use of the most familiar techniques of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Let us now trace its equally adroit use of the technique of in-
tratextualism. We have already noted that even before he turns to the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Marshall argues that the earlier Article
I, Section 8 "great powers" of "[t]he sword and the purse" are ample
enough to sustain the creation of a federal bank.35 But Maryland's
counterargument, interpreted most charitably, is that the various enu-
merated powers should be construed far more strictly than Marshall
has proposed, and that the specific words of the Necessary and Proper
Clause confirm the imperative of strict construction. Congress should
enjoy only those implied incidental powers that are logically "neces-
sary" to carry out its express powers. A federal bank might be useful
trates their minds wonderfully): "The only security against the abuse of [taxation] power, is found
in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its constitu-
ents. This is in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation." McCul-
loch, 17 U.S. at 428 (emphasis added). There are also traces of this idea in specific constitutional
clauses - for example, the Direct Tax Clause of Article I, Section 2, which provides that direct
taxes and congressional representation be apportioned by the same formula. It should not be sur-
prising that different techniques of constitutional interpretation often overlap and converge. The
various types of argument are not sealed off from each other, and ultimately they are all mere
tools to help us draw meaning from the same source - the American Constitution in word and
deed.
32 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 402.
33 Id. at 404-05.
34 Like all lawyers of his generation, Lincoln had surely read McCulloch as a young man, and
perhaps many times thereafter. For a brilliant discussion of other sources of influence on Lin-
coln's famous phrasing, see GARRY WILLs, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG 107-08, 129-31, 281 n.24
(1992).
35 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407-08.
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and convenient, but it is riot logically "necessary" to have a federal
bank to, say, have a federal army. As a matter of logic, one can imag-
ine an army without a bank. Thus a bank is, strictly speaking, not
necessary. In response, Marshall concedes that the word "necessary" is
sometimes used as a term of logic or math meaning strictly indispen-
sable, sine qua non. But, Marshall counters, the word does not in-
variably (a wag might say "necessarily") mean this: "If reference be
had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved
authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing
is convenient, or useful ... to another. '36 If the word were invariably
a term of math or logic, it could never be modified by an adverb of
degree. And yet, Marshall argues, in ordinary language, such adverbs
do modify the word: "[A] thing may be necessary, very necessary, ab-
solutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea
be conveyed, by these several phrases."37
Thus far, Marshall's analysis seems methodologically unremark-
able. It is a standard clause-bound exegesis appealing to plain mean-
ing, ordinary language, and (perhaps implicitly) original intent. Ordi-
nary Americans ratified the Constitution, and the word "necessary"
should be understood in its ordinary sense as confirmed by usage "in
the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors." But at pre-
cisely this point, Marshall makes an intriguing methodological turn.
Rather than pointing to, say, Samuel Johnson's dictionary to prove his
philological point, he turns to another passage in the Constitution it-
self, in effect using the Constitution as its own dictionary:
This comment on the word ["necessary"] is well illustrated, by the passage
cited at the bar,38 from the Ioth section of the ist article of the constitu-
tion. It is, we think, impossible to compare the sentence which prohibits a
State from laying "imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws," with that
which authorizes Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution" the powers of the general government,
without feeling a conviction that the convention understood itself to
change materially the meaning of the word "necessary," by prefixing the
word "absolutely."3 )
36 Id. at 413.
37 Id. at 414.
38 As Marshall graciously acknowledges, the argument he is about to make borrows from Wil-
liam Pinkney's oral argument, see id. at 387-88, which Justice Joseph Story described as "brilliant
and sparkling," and which the historian Charles Warren labeled "the greatest effort of [Pinkney's]
life." I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 507-08 (1922).
Marshall himself later called Pinkney "the greatest man I ever saw in a Court of justice." 14
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 626, 628 (Dumas Malone ed., 1934) (citation omitted).
39 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414-15.
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With pointed italics (a font that he uses exceedingly sparingly in the
opinion),40 Marshall shows that the Constitution itself proves that
"necessary" is not always a term of math or logic; that it sometimes
takes an adverb that can modify its strictness; and that without an ad-
verb such as "absolutely," the word as used in the Necessary and
Proper Clause can be read flexibly not strictly, practically not mathe-
matically. Here then we see a classic example of intratextualism: es-
tablishing the meaning of a word in one constitutional clause by ana-
lyzing its use in another constitutional clause.
Though Marshall does not mention the point, other constitutional
clauses using the word "necessary" confirm his claim that the term is
regularly used in a practical, nonmathematical way. In Article V, for
example, Congress is empowered, "whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary," to propose constitutional amend-
ments.41 Context here seems to make abundantly clear that the test is
practical not logical. Most of the first twelve amendments on the
books at the time of McCulloch could not be deemed mathematically
necessary and indispensable, but they could all be considered useful or
convenient. Textually, if "necessary" here truly means logically re-
quired, then talk of "deeming" seems obtuse. As a matter of math and
logic, either something is necessary or it is not. A similar analysis ap-
plies to Article II, Section 3, which empowers the President to recom-
mend to Congress "such Measures as he shall judge necessary and ex-
pedient."42  Here too, we have a clear recognition - and in the
Constitution itself, as a kind of dictionary - that "necessary" can often
mean useful.
Marshall has another intratextual ace in hand, and he gracefully
plays it, with a bit less flourish, over the next few pages. First, he
nonchalantly reminds us that the word "necessary" is synonymous with
the word "needful. 43 Then, a few paragraphs later, he quietly shows
us his trump card by directing our attention, without any italics, to Ar-
ticle IV, Section 3:
The power to "make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other property belonging to the United States," is not more com-
prehensive, than the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
40 Apart from a pair of proper citational references to Publius's Federalist, and a few stray
stylistic tics, the only words italicized in the opinion are absolutely, necessary, proper, and consti-
tution (the latter in Marshall's celebrated reminder that "it is a constitution we are expounding").
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407, 413, 414, 418; see also id. at 408, 410, 415 (tics); id. at 431 (capitalizing
word, "CONFIDENCE").
41 U.S. CONST. art. V.
42 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
43 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418.
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proper for carrying into execution" the powers of the government. Yet all
admit the constitutionality of a territorial government, which is a corpo-
rate body.
4 4
If a territorial corporation is "needful" under one clause of the Con-
stitution, Marshall needles, why isn't a bank corporation similarly
"necessary" under another clause of that very same document? If
"necessary" in Article I and "needful" in Article IV are synonymous in
ordinary language and constitutional context, surely they should be
construed the same way.45 And when we accept Marshall's invitation
to inspect the Necessary and Proper and Territorial Clauses side by
side, we see further parallels of style and substance at work. Stylisti-
cally, both clauses open with absolutely identical phraseology ("The
Congress shall have power"), a parallelism suggesting that the clauses
are indeed designed as intratextual counterparts of sorts. Substan-
tively, the first clause confirms broad congressional power in the ex-
isting states, and the second clause snugly complements it by confer-
ring broad congressional power in the states-to-be. The two clauses
are, as a fancy lawyer might say, virtually in haec verba and in pari
materia.46 Or to put the point in more popular prose, what's sauce for
the Article IV, Section 3 goose should be sauce for the Article I, Section
8 gander. Here too, Marshall uses the document itself as a kind of dic-
tionary and concordance, and to good effect.
2. Martin. - A single case can prove only so much, and even a
case as great as McCulloch would, if it stood alone, fail to establish the
pedigree of a basic form of constitutional argument. More broadly, we
might well wonder whether the intratextual technique was unique to
Marshall.47 Let us then consider the most important and canonical
early constitutional case not authored by John Marshall: Justice
44 Id. at 422.
45 Of course, a contrarian might concede that both clauses should be read the same way, but
insist that both be read narrowly. But as Marshall argues, no one has taken this position regard-
ing territorial corporations, which stand as fixed landmarks in the legal landscape. Note how
Marshall's intratextual analysis here dovetails with an implicit argument from settled practice.
46 Virtually, but not exactly. Whereas the Territories Clause confers plenary power on Con-
gress - if Congress cannot legislate, no one else can - the Necessary and Proper Clause must be
read against the backdrop of state legislative power to regulate. Indeed, Marshall admits that the
Necessary and Proper Clause may not add any power at all to the preexisting enumerations, and
he also admits that these enumerations fall short of granting Congress plenary legislative power in
the states. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405, 420-2 1. How might Marshall square all this with his
intratextual linkage of "necessary" and "needful" in the two clauses? Perhaps by saying that the
key constraints in the Necessary and Proper Clause exist not by dint of the flexible word "neces-
sary," but because of the other words in the clause - "and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers." U.S. CONST. art. i. § 8, cl. 18. For a general discussion of these other words
and the constraints they may impose, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"
Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267
(i993).
47 Or more precisely, to Marshall and the notable lawyer William Pinkney, see supra note 38.
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Story's landmark decision for the Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.41
To be sure, Martin is written in a grand style that anticipates McCul-
loch. Story's own son paid Martin his highest compliment when he
attributed to his father's opinion "clearness and solidity of argumenta-
tion" and "all the peculiar merits of the best judgments of Marshall, -
compactness of fibre and closeness of logic."49 But Story was no mere
copycat. Rather, the man who would one day hold the Dane Profes-
sorship of Law at Harvard and write the most important treatise on
constitutional law of the century (not to mention countless other dis-
tinguished works of legal scholarship) was a towering jurist in his own
right; and if there is indeed a stylistic affinity between Martin and
McCulloch, we do well to remember that Story's opinion came first.50
As Marshall will do three years later, Story begins his substantive
analysis with a broad-brush narrative of the nature and origin of the
federal Constitution. The document is, Story insists, not a mere treaty
or compact established by the "states in their sovereign capacities."5'
Rather, it "was ordained and established.., emphatically, as the pre-
amble of the constitution declares, by 'the people of the United
States."''5 2 This point, Story emphasizes in the next paragraph, is con-
firmed by the language of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves pow-
ers not simply to the respective states, but also, Story stresses with
italics, "to the people. '- 3 The intratextual move here - reading the
first words of the Preamble alongside the last words of the Tenth
Amendment, and harmonizing their invocations of "the people" - is
rather subtle and slightly underdeveloped. Story does not quite drive
the point home in a single sentence yoking the two clauses and ex-
claiming, "Look here, each clause must be seen alongside the other -
both use the same phrase!" But this is precisely what Story does, over
and over, with other constitutional clauses in the remainder of his
opinion.
The first important clause confronting Story is the opening sen-
tence of Article Il, Section i declaring that "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such infe-
rior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish. '54 Are the words "shall be vested" to be understood as a kind of
48 14 U.S. ( Wheat.) 304 (gx86).
49 I LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 275-76 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
So We cannot rule out the possibility - perhaps probability - that although Marshall had
recused himself in the Martin case, he nonetheless discussed issues of substance and style with
Story. But of course that possibility exists for every non-Marshall opinion handed down in the
Marshall era. Thus we shall also examine more recent cases and legal commentary for traces of
intratextualism, lest it be thought that the technique was unique to the Marshall Court.
S5 Martin, 14 U.S. at 324.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 3 a5.54 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ I.
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prediction, or as a mandate? Is "shall" here a future-tense verb or an
imperative verb? Story begins with a series of intratextual claims, us-
ing italics to highlight other Article III phrases featuring the word
"shall," and insisting that the same word should mean the same thing
in all of these companion clauses:
The language of the article throughout is manifestly designed to be man-
datory upon the legislature.... The judicial power of the United States
shall be vested (not may be vested) in one supreme court, and in such infe-
rior courts as congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.
Could congress have lawfully refused to create a supreme court, or to vest
in it the constitutional jurisdiction? "The judges, both of the supreme and
inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at
stated times, receive for their services, a compensation which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office." Could congress create or
limit any other tenure of the judicial office? Could they refuse to pay, at
stated times, the stipulated salary, or diminish it during the continuance in
office? But one answer can be given to these questions: it must be in the
negative.
55
But Story is not finished with his intratextual exegesis of the Arti-
cle III Vesting Clause. In the next paragraph, he places the clause
alongside the similarly worded Vesting Clauses of Articles I and 11.56
Given that these other Vesting Clauses (which he dutifully italicizes)
are manifestly mandatory, he insists that Article III's Vesting Clause
must likewise be mandatory:
The same expression, "shall be vested," occurs in other parts of the
constitution, in defining the powers of the other co-ordinate branches of
the government. The first article declares that "all legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States." Will it
be contended that the legislative power is not absolutely vested? [T]hat
the words merely refer to some future act, and mean only that the legisla-
tive power may hereafter be vested? The second article declares that "the
executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of
America." Could congress vest it in any other person; or, is it to await
their good pleasure, whether it is to vest at all? It is apparent that such a
construction, in either case, would be utterly inadmissible. Why, then, is it
entitled to a better support in reference to the judicial department?- 7
The key intratextual claim here is that the same phrase (in this case,
"shall be vested") should be similarly construed in each clause in which
it appears - almost as if the Constitution contained an explicit direc-
tive to construe these particular clauses in pari materia or, more gen-
erally, to construe all like words and phrases alike. Though Story does
not mention the point, his interlinkage of the three Vesting Clauses de-
55 Martin, i U.S. at 328-29.




rives further support from their precisely parallel and prominent
placement in the Constitution's organization chart, as the first sentence
of Articles I, II, and IH, respectively.
Story is on a roll here, and he returns to the intratextual technique
a couple of pages later when confronting the meaning of the Article
II, Section 2 clause that provides that the judicial power of the United
States "shall extend" to various cases and controversies.58 Once again
he insists that "shall" means "must," not "will," and proves the point by
appealing to the use of the word "shall" in other constitutional clauses,
using the document itself as his law dictionary:
This imperative sense of the words "shall extend," is strengthened by
the context. It is declared that "in all cases affecting ambassadors, &c.,
that the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction." Could congress
withhold original jurisdiction in these cases from the supreme court? The
clause proceeds - "in all the other cases before mentioned the supreme
court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such regulations, as the congress shall make." The
very exception here shows that the Framers of the constitution used the
words in an imperative sense. What necessity could there exist for this ex-
ception if the preceding words were not used in that sense? Without such
exception, congress would, by the preceding words, have possessed a com-
plete power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction, if the language were
only equivalent to the words "may have" appellate jurisdiction....
Other clauses in the constitution might be brought in aid of this con-
struction; but a minute examination of them cannot be necessary, and
would occupy too much time. It will be found that whenever a particular
object is to be effected, the language of the constitution is always impera-
tive .... 
5 9
So far, Story is ringing variations on a single intratextual theme: the
same (or very similar) words in the same document should, at least
presumptively, be construed in the same (or a very similar) way. But
the flip side of the intratextual coin is that when two (or more) clauses
feature different wording, this difference may also be a clue to mean-
ing, and invite different construction of the different words. In
McCulloch, Marshall shows us both sides of the coin when he argues
that the word "necessary" in Article I, Section 8 should mean the same
thing as the similar word "needful" in Article IV, Section 3, but should
mean something different from the different words "absolutely neces-
sary" in Article I, Section io. Story also sees the flip side of the in-
tratextual coin, as he makes clear in parsing the jurisdictional menu of
Article III, which lists various types of lawsuits appropriate for federal
courts:
58 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
59 Martin, 14 U.S. at 332-33. In the middle of this passage, Story offers up a textbook illustra-
tion of the much misunderstood idea of "the exception that proves the rule."
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It will be observed that there are two classes of cases enumerated in the
constitution, between which a distinction seems to be drawn. The first
class includes cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States; cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In this class the
expression is ... that the judicial power shall extend to all cases; but in
the subsequent part of the clause which embraces all the other cases of na-
tional cognizance, and forms the second class, the word "all" is dropped
seemingly ex industria. Here the judicial authority is to extend to contro-
versies (not to all controversies) to which the United States shall be a
party, &c. From this difference of phraseology, perhaps, a difference of
constitutional intention may, with propriety, be inferred. It is hardly to be
presumed that the variation in the language could have been accidental.
It must have been the result. of some determinate reason; and it is not very
difficult to find a reason sufficient to support the apparent change of in-
tention. In respect to the first class, it may well have been the intention of
the framers of the constitution imperatively to extend the judicial power
either in an original or appellate form to all cases; and in the latter class to
leave it to congress to qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such
manner as public policy might dictate.
60
In this important passage, Story is laying out what I have else-
where labeled the "two-tier" theory of Article III, according to which
Congress must allow federal courts to pronounce the last word on all
federal question, admiralty, and ambassador-related cases, but may
shift any or all diversity and other party-based lawsuits to state courts
for final disposition. 61 On other occasions, I have tried to defend
Story's two-tier theory, but for now my interest is less substantive than
methodological. Story's basic argument in this passage seems intratex-
tual: he is emphasizing not merely the presence of the word "all" in
some parts of the menu, or the absence of the word "all" in other parts
of the menu - standard textual moves - but the strikingly selective
use of the word. "All" is used not once, not twice, but three times in
the menu, and then is twice omitted. The key here is the intratextual
"difference in phraseology," the "variation in the language." (Although
Story does not stress the point, the next passage in Article III, specify-
ing the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, follows this pattern by
using the word "all" to refer to first tier ambassador-related cases and
then omitting the word when referring to second tier state-diversity
lawsuits.62)
60 Id. at 333-34.
61 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article I.I: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 2 l0-15, 24o-46 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Two Tiers].
62 See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section i3, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443, 478-88 (1989) [hereinafter Amar, Marbury]; Amar, Two Tiers, supra
note 6i, at 242-43, 254 n.i6o.
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Alternatively, we could view the entire jurisdictional menu as a sin-
gle clause - long, intricate, and varied, to be sure, but nonetheless one
unified patch of text. Indeed, we might even view all of Article III,
Sections i and 2 as a single (very long, multi-sentenced) clause of sorts.
On this view, Story's parsing of one part of the menu in light of an-
other part of the same menu, and his use of neighboring "shall[s]"
within a single passage to illuminate each other, might seem less
strikingly intratextual: we might call this interpretive approach para-
graphism rather than full-blown intratextualism. But however we ul-
timately classify Story's interpretive moves within Article H1,63 we
have seen at least two more dramatic exemplars of intratextualism,
Story-style: the subtle intratextual bridge connecting the Preamble and
the Tenth Amendment, and the strong intratextual chain linking to-
gether the three Vesting Clauses. In both examples, Story urges us to
read one clause in light of another clause (or two) appearing many
constitutional paragraphs away. And so it seems clear that Marshall
was not alone in prominently deploying intratextualism.
3. Marbury. - A sound technique of constitutional interpretation
can, prove its worth not just in cases in which it was used well, but
also in cases in which it could have been used and was not. If, upon
reflection, we think that a given opinion that failed to use a particular
technique is legally weaker and less satisfying than it otherwise would
have been, then this too is evidence of the legal significance of that
technique. With this in mind, let us turn to the great Marshall opinion
that stands first in time, first in place (in most constitutional law case-
books), and first in the hearts of many modern lawyers and judges:
Marbury v. Madison.
64
The particular constitutional issue in Marbury that prompts the
Court's grand assertion of judicial review is a narrow one: may Con-
gress expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? Here are
the words of Article mEI:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
65
Here is the nub of Marshall's analysis:
If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction,
where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and
original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appel-
63 As I shall explain later, I am ultimately less interested in classifying these moves and more
interested in recognizing some of their strengths and weaknesses. See infra Part I1.
64 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803).
6S U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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late; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form
without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other ob-
jects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense
must be given to them, or they have no operation at all. 6 6
Over the course of five paragraphs, Marshall basically repeats this
point over and over without illuminating it, claiming that any other
reading of Article Ill renders its words regarding original jurisdiction
"entirely without meaning," "form without substance," with "no opera-
tion at all," "without effect," and "inoperative."6 7
As a matter of simple logic, however, there are two obvious possi-
ble alternatives to Marbury's reading of the Original Jurisdiction
Clause as a constitutional maximum. First, the language in Article III
could be read to prescribe only a minimum, not a maximum, amount
of original jurisdiction. Second, the language might have been de-
signed to establish neither a minimum nor a maximum but simply a
starting point - a default rule - from which Congress may depart by
statute in either direction. Neither of these alternative readings ren-
ders the Original Jurisdiction Clause meaningless - under both alter-
natives, the clause does some work. Marshall does not confront these
other possible readings; he simply assumes that the clause must be a
maximum or nothing and then chants over and over that it cannot
mean nothing.
Leading scholars have not been kind to Marshall's exposition here,
calling it "far from obvious," 68 "clearly overstated,"6 9 and "surely
wrong. '70  But it is precisely at this point that a more elaborate in-
tratextual comparison than Marshall offered would have enabled him
to rebut his modern scholarly critics. The Appellate Jurisdiction
Clause explicitly authorizes Congress to subtract from the Supreme
Court's appellate docket; but the Original Jurisdiction Clause contains
no comparable language authorizing Congress to add to the Court's
original jurisdiction docket. Just as the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause
confers jurisdiction "with such exceptions as Congress shall make, '71
so the Original Jurisdiction Clause should have conferred jurisdiction
"with such augmentations (and exceptions) as Congress shall make"
had it been designed as a minimum (or a default rule) rather than a
maximum. The fact that the Original Jurisdiction Clause does not
contain augmentation wording symmetric to the exception wording of
66 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174.
67 Id. at 174-75.
68 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 68 (1985).
69 William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I, 31.
70 MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER I I (1980).
71 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause elegantly buttresses Marshall's con-
clusion that Congress has no power to add to the Court's original
docket. The point here is not a standard textual point about the
Original Jurisdiction Clause, but a Story-like intratextual point that
emphasizes the variation in language between this clause and the next
one.
Granted, comparison of adjoining clauses within a single Article -
paragraphism - is a very modest form of intratextualism. And the
original jurisdiction issue in Marbury is of course not the main attrac-
tion. If Marbury is our Hamlet, the Prince is judicial review.72 Yet
when we turn to the star of the show, we see again that intratextualism
- and this time, intratextualism of a less modest form - could have
strengthened Marshall's exposition.
There are many arguments for judicial review, but perhaps the
most elegant and forceful is the simple two-pronged notion that the
Constitution is supreme law, and that judges must apply this law in
cases within their jurisdiction. Marshall makes both of these points in
Marbury and offers considerable support for each. Among other
things, he invokes two specific constitutional clauses. In the middle of
his exposition on judicial review, he supports the second prong by
paraphrasing the words of Article III as follows: "The judicial power
of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitu-
tion."73 And a couple of pages later, at the very end of his opinion, he
supports the first prong by paraphrasing the words of Article VI as
follows: "[I]n declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United
States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of
the constitution, have that rank."74  Each of these textual points is
strong, but various twentieth-century critics of judicial review have
remained skeptical. Even if each textual point makes sense in isola-
tion, is it proper to conjoin them, to pull the two prongs together?
Perhaps this kind of selective textualism cobbles a seemingly inte-
grated whole out of parts that were not designed to be read together.
The concern here brings to mind the joke about the fellow asked to
quote a couple of passages of scripture who replied: "Judas went and
hanged himself... Go thou and do likewise."75
72 For those with a special interest in the Rosencrantz-and-Guildenstern-size topic of original
jurisdiction, see Amar, Marbury, cited above in note 62, at 453-63, featuring an intratextualist
analysis of the Judiciary Act to cast doubt on the Court's reading of Section 13. This analysis
illustrates that intratextualism can be used as a technique of statutory as well as constitutional
interpretation. My topic today, however, is the latter, and some of the arguments I shall consider
concerning constitutional intratextualism may not apply straightforwardly in the statutory con-
text. See infra note 204.
73 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
74 Id. at 18o.
75 The joke stitches together snippets of Matthew 27:5 and Luke 10:37.
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But it is at precisely this point that an intratextual argument would
have powerfully cross-braced Marshall's sturdy edifice in Marbury.
Even though one clause appears in Article III and the other in far-
away Article VI, intratextual analysis suggests that they were indeed
designed to be read together, as interlocking parts of a coherent whole,
two prongs meant to affirm one result: judicial review. The clauses are
written in obviously parallel language, as is clear when we bring them
side by side and quote them precisely. (Marbury did neither.) Article
III vests federal courts with jurisdiction over all cases arising under
"this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;" and Article VI pro-
claims as supreme law "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States." Q.E.D.
7 6
4. Brown and Bolling. - Having considered a trilogy of great
nineteenth-century cases, let us now ponder the most celebrated judi-
cial event of the next century. On May 17, 1954, the Justices decided
the companion cases of Brown v. Board of Education7 7 and Bolling v.
Sharpe,75 invalidating de jure racial segregation in state and federal
schools, respectively.
Brown seems easy enough to understand. The Fourteenth
Amendment demands that "state[s]" give blacks "equal" protection, but
black schools under Jim Crow are not equal. They are inherently
unequal in purpose and effect and social meaning. But Bolling seems
harder to explain. As the Boiling Court admits, "The Fifth Amend-
ment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain
an Equal Protection Clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which
applies only to the states. '79 It might be thought that even if Bolling
were somehow suspect, Brown itself would emerge untouched. But
are these fraternal twins, born on the same great day and sired by the
same great Chief, really so easy to separate? Could the Court on May
17, 1954, tell states that they must abandon Jim Crow in education yet
in the same breath uphold (segregated) business as usual in federal
schools? The very idea was "unthinkable," according to the Court that
day.80 Had Bolling been decided in favor of segregation, would its
76 Records of the Philadelphia Convention - not published until decades after Marbury -
confirm that the parallel language here was no accident but part of a conscious design in contem-
plation of judicial review. See 2 THE: RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
430-31 (Max Farrand rev. ed., 1937) (rewording the Supremacy Clause to render it "conform-
abl[e]" to wording of the federal question jurisdiction clause) [hereinafter FARRAND]. On the pos-
sible similarities and differences between intratextualism and standard forms of "original intent"
jurisprudence, see Part II below.
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
79 Id. at 499.
80 See id. at 5oo.
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companion Brown have meant the same thing that it did on May 17,
1954? Would Brown mean the same thing that it does today? To af-
firm the legal rightness of Brown, we cannot simply ignore Bolling.
Like runners in a three-legged race, these cases are tied together, and if
one is lame, the other cannot easily glide to victory.
But perhaps Bolling is legally right, and even easy, after all. The
case takes up less than four pages in United States Reports, and so if
we are to find the key to its rightness, we must read with great care.
Chief Justice Warren nods toward judicial doctrine, but several of the
cases he cites have nothing to do with race; two others - Korematsu8l
and Hirabayashi8' - are just a tad less odious than Dred Scott; 3 and
yet another wave to doctrine consists of an undeveloped one-sentence
dictum from an 1896 Harlan opinion. 4 Warren mouths a couple of
buzzwords from standard due process jargon - "liberty" and "arbi-
trary"s - but the effort seems forced and formulaic, as if he is simply
going through the motions. And there is an obvious intratextual diffi-
culty with Warren's emphasis on due process: don't the words "due
process" in the Fifth Amendment mean the same thing as the words
"due process" in the Fourteenth Amendment, which in turn mean
something different than the words "equal protection" in the Four-
teenth Amendment? Warren also says that racial classifications are
"contrary to our traditions,"8 6 but Jim Crow is, alas, a rather strong
competing tradition in America, and one that in 1954 still enjoys the
formal blessing of Plessy.87 (Plessy is of course not formally overruled
but merely distinguished away, as inapplicable to education, in the
companion Brown case."") More promising is Warren's reminder that
various clauses of our Constitution stem from the same taproot, "our
American ideal of fairness." 9 Here we have the glimmerings of what
Professor Bobbitt might call a proper ethical argument. But Warren
does not develop the point, and a half-whispered ethical argument
without more is not exactly rock-solid, legally speaking.
We come, then, to Bolling's most passionate and powerful state-
ment, which only strengthens its bond with Brown: "In view of our de-
cision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining ra-
81 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), cited in Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 n.3.
82 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 ('943), cited in Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 n.3.
83 Scott v. Sanford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393 (1857).
84 See Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 ("[Tihe Constitution of the United States, in its present form,
forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Govern-
ment, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race." (quoting Gibson v. Misssissippi,
162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896))).
8s Id. at 5oo.
86 Id. at 499.
87 Plessy v. Ferguson, 63 U.S. 537 (1896).
88 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.").
89 Boling, 347 U.S. at 499.
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cially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Govern-
ment."90 Here, we have a deep constitutional intuition: there is only
one Constitution, and in the matter of school segregation, that docu-
ment should mean no less for the federal government than for the
states. "[T]he same Constitution" should mean the same thing here -
what's sauce for the states should be sauce for the feds.
But where exactly does the Constitution say that? Bolling does not
give us a great deal of guidance, but it does drop a couple of clues.
First, perhaps Justice Harlan had something quite specific in mind
when in 1896 he announced for the Court, in a dictum that Bolling
quotes, that "the Constitution of the United States, in its present form,
forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination
by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen be-
cause of his race."91 Harlan's reference to the Constitution "in its pre-
sent form" seems to point to the (then-recent) Civil War Amendments,
as opposed to the document that emerged at the Founding. His refer-
ence to "political rights" plainly alludes to the Fifteenth Amendment,
prohibiting both state and federal officials from abridging the right to
vote on the basis of race. But Brown and Bolling are not voting cases,
so let us pass over the Fifteenth. Harlan also said that even in cases
involving civil rights - like access to government-run schools - nei-
ther state nor federal officials can discriminate "against any citizen be-
cause of his race." 92 The giveaway word here is "citizen," a word that
should immediately direct our attention to the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. '93 Here is a clause
that plainly limits the feds as well as the states. And its particular ap-
plication to the issue of race is plain. As every schoolchild learns (or
should learn), this sentence was put in the Constitution to repudiate in
the most emphatic way the vile holding of Dred Scott that black per-
sons could never be citizens because blacks were beings of an inferior
order, creatures that no "white man was bound to respect. '94 Gov-
ernment-sponsored efforts to stigmatize blacks, to relegate them to a
kind of second-class citizenship, violate the core concept of the Citi-
zenship Clause. All are declared citizens, and thus all are equal citi-
zens. As Harlan himself put the point in the sentence immediately
90 Id. at 500.
91 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (I896), quoted in Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499.
92 Id.
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
94 Scott v. Sanford, 6o U.S. (ig How.) 393, 407 (1857).
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following the one that Bolling quotes: "All citizens are equal before the
law.
95
Standing alone, the Citizenship Clause gives us a clean textual ar-
gument that is enough to carry the day in Bolling. But nothing in this
argument is particularly intratextual. And the Citizenship Clause is
obviously limited to citizens, whereas the Bolling Court's emphasis on
Fifth Amendment due process seems to sweep more broadly: under
that Amendment, "no person" - rather than no citizen - shall be de-
nied due process of law. So let us turn from Harlan and go back to
Warren himself in search of further clues. Harlan deployed a single
specific clause, but Warren seems to have something more general in
mind when he pronounces it "unthinkable" that as to certain issues,
the constitutional rules for states and feds should differ. Harlan fo-
cused on the Reconstruction Amendments, but in a pair of sentences,
Warren gestures toward a Founding-era text. Liberty, he says, can be
restricted only by a "proper" governmental objective, and
"[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective. '96 This is McCulloch talk, with a sub-
tle allusion to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Founders' Con-
stitution implied by Warren's repeated use of the word "proper."
In response, a critic could say that Warren's basic intuition - that
it is "unthinkable" that the "same Constitution" would regulate the
state governments and the federal government differently - is way off
base. Under the Founders' Constitution, the rules were emphatically
different for the two governments. For example, states could not im-
pair the obligation of contract, but the federal government could.
Conversely, the federal government could not compel self-
incrimination, but the states could. And there are no sentences in the
original Constitution that say "neither the federal government nor the
states may. .. ."
It is precisely at this point that an intratextual analysis rides to
Warren's rescue. True, there are no single-sentence clauses in the
original Constitution that explicitly hold the two governments to the
same standards. But there are indeed a handful (and only a handful)
95 Gibson, x62 U.S. at 59i. It might be asked whether this reading of the Citizenship Clause
renders the neighboring Equal Protection Clause redundant. Technically, it does not - the for-
mer clause applies only to citizens, whereas the latter encompasses all persons, with a special con-
cern for aliens. See AKHIm REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 171-74 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]. More generally, how-
ever, certain constitutional clauses may well be seen as declaratory, making explicit what is only
implicit in other clauses. Marshall in McCulloch argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause,
for example, might merely be declaratory. And so, I would argue, is the Tenth Amendment. In
addition, many of the specific criminal procedure provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
might be seen as declaratory glosses on the sweeping Due Process Clause. For more discussion of
the ubiquity of declaratory clauses, see Amar, Clarifying Clauses, supra note ii. See also infra pp.
773.
96 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500.
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of intratextually paired clauses that - when read together, as their
similar wording invites - implicitly do so. Putting these clauses side
by side for analysis, in good intratextual fashion, we have the follow-
ing:
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed [by Congress]. 9 7
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States .... 98
No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law ... or
grant any Title of Nobility.99
To an intratextualist, it is as if the Constitution here said explicitly, "As
to the following three items, the state and federal governments must
meet the same standards." In Bolling's phraseology, as to these three
things at least, it is indeed "unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose" different duties on the two sets of governments. Re-
markably, the result in Bolling could comfortably be defended by ref-
erence to two of the three items in this handful of clauses.
Consider first the Nobility Clauses. If we take these words and
their underlying principles seriously, no government - state or federal
- can name some Americans "lords" and others "commoners." Ours is
a democratic republic, not an aristocracy based on birth and blood. 10 0
Of course at the Founding these words and their underlying principles
were not taken seriously where blacks were involved - but after the
Civil War Amendments, there is no good reason to ignore these
Founding words, especially in light of the emphatic reaffirmation of
their basic idea of republican equality in the Citizenship Clause itself.
How does all this relate to the facts of Bolling? Here's how: if no gov-
ernment can name some (light-skinned) Americans "lords" and other
(dark-skinned) Americans "commoners," surely it cannot do the same
thing through racially segregated schools whose purpose and effect and
social meaning is to create a blood-based and hereditary overclass and
underclass.
Now turn to the paired Attainder Clauses. No legislature, state or
federal, may single a person out by name and subject him to special
penalty or ridicule or disadvantage. Legislatures may pass general and
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
98 Id. at cl. 8.
99 Id. at § 1o, cl. i.
100 See generally GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992)
(chronicling "the democratization of early America"); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of
Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 (1994) ("The central pillar of Republican Government... is popular
sovereignty."); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, lo6 YALE LJ. 2313, 2316 (1997) ("[T]he
Constitution is committed to the realization of democratic culture, even though constitutional law
... cannot realize this goal by its own efforts.").
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prospective laws - "all who henceforth commit deed X shall suffer
penalty F" - but the legislature may not target human beings for dis-
favored treatment because of who they are as opposed to what they
do. And there is a special historical link between attainders and "cor-
ruption of the blood" in which legislatures tried to taint or stain a per-
son's bloodline. (Note the intratextual link between the above-quoted
Attainder Clauses, and the Article III, Section 3 rule that "No Attain-
der of 'reason shall work Corruption of Blood."0l) If we take the
nonattainder principle seriously, it bars lawmakers - federal no less
than state - from passing laws designed to humiliate or demean all
persons descended from slaves, or all persons with black (corrupt)
blood.'0 2 Of course the deep meaning of this principle was also disre-
garded, insofar as blacks were involved, before the Civil War Amend-
ments - but once again there is no reason today to continue disre-
garding these clauses. Indeed, the NAACP explicitly relied on the
Attainder Clause in Bolling10 3 (following in the footsteps of the great
Frederick Douglass, who insisted that slavery itself violated nonattain-
der principles'04). More recently, the most eminent constitutional
scholar and litigator of our era, Harvard's Professor Laurence Tribe,
has noted in the pages of this Review that the nonattainder principle
comfortably supports the result in Bolling.05
Note that intratextualism itself does not compel a broad reading of
the Title of Nobility and Attainder Clauses. The tool simply leads us
to these clauses as among the handful of Founding-era texts using the
same phrases to limit both state and federal governments. As we shall
see in Parts II and III, intratextualism often merely provides an inter-
pretive lead or clue, the full meaning of which will only become ap-
parent when other interpretive tools are also brought to bear on the
problem.
Having considered a couple of ways in which intratextualism
would have confirmed Bolling's most powerful constitutional instinct
and buttressed its seemingly rickety structure, it remains to consider
more carefully the most obvious intratextual issue in Bolling itself: the
triadic relationship between the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the latter
Amendment. What the case holds is that "racial segregation in the
public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process
101 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2.
102 For more extended argument for, and analysis of, this claim, see Akhil Reed Amar, Attain-
der and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203, 208-17 (1996).
103 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 522 (r994).
104 See Frederick Douglass, Speech Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland (March 26, i86o), in 2 LIFE
AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467-80 (Philip Foner ed., 1950).
105 See Laurence H. Tfribe, Taking Text and History Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, zo8 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1298-99 n.247 (1995).
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of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.' ' 6
But there is an evident embarrassment in this argument, and it is an
intratextual embarrassment: "due process" in the Fifth Amendment
should presumptively mean the same thing as "due process" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, and these latter words are apparently contra-
distinguished from the equality idea, which appears in a different
Fourteenth Amendment clause. (We see both sides of the intratextual-
ist coin here: "due process" is the same as "due process" which is differ-
ent from "equal protection.") Warren is aware of this embarrassment,
and I suggest that this is in part why his opinion is so crabbed: the
very awkwardness of his analysis is evidence of the powerful pull of
intratextual argument.
But like all legitimate forms of argument, intratextualism can often
be used on both sides of a given issue. Ironically, the best intratextual
analysis'0 7 of the triadic relation of the three clauses in fact supports
both Warren's general intuition and his specific due process holding,
providing yet another intratextual basis for affirming the rightness of
Bolling. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that due
process of law meant a suitably general evenhanded law.'08 "Law" in
its nature was general, equal, impartial, and the "process" that gener-
ated law must respect that nature. 10 9 Thus, for the framers and ratifi-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the words of its Equal Protection
Clause were not expressing a different idea than the words of the Due
Process Clause but were elaborating the same idea: the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was in part a clarifying gloss on the due process idea. (In-
deed, an early draft of the Amendment spoke of "equal protection in
the rights of life, liberty, and property.""10) And here is the intratextual
kicker: if equal protection really was implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment concept of "due process of law," as its framers believed
and said, then after the ratification of this Amendment, equal protec-
106 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
107 The notion of a "best" intratextul argument, of course, presupposes a theory of intratextu-
alism and a calculus by which to compare intratextual arguments. For discussion of how one
would assess the strengths and weaknesses of a given intratextual argument, see Part II below.
108 For more elaboration and documentation of this claim, and my other claims in this para-
graph, see AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, cited above in note 95, at 280-83, and Akhil Reed Amar,
Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and Reverse Incorporation,
in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 71
(Terry Eastland ed., 1995).
109 Note that this is not full-blown substantive due process, in which the argument would be
that because law is in its nature good and just, any enactment which (in the minds of judges) is
not good is not "law." By contrast, the equality argument sounds more in procedure - the legis-
lative process must be suitably general and prospective. A proper lawmaking procedure may
generate a broad range of substantive results, but must apply to all (or more modestly, must not
single out individuals for special disfavored treatment). On this procedural view, due process of
law focuses on both law-making procedure and law-applying procedure, on process writ large and
process writ small.
110 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1034 (1866); see also infra p. 825 (quoting this draft).
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tion should also be seen as implicit in the Fifth Amendment phrase
"due process of law." What's sauce for the Fourteenth Amendment
should intratextually be sauce for the Fifth.
Consider once again the 1896 Harlan opinion we have already
noted, in which the great Justice likewise blends together the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses. He proclaims that the "guarantees
of life, liberty and property are fbr all persons within the jurisdiction
... without discrimination against any because of their race.""' Note
how this formulation marries due process language ("life, liberty, and
property') with equal protection language ("all persons within the ju-
risdiction," a phrase found only in the Equal Protection Clause) and
equal protection norms against race discrimination. Taken seriously,
this marriage supports an intratextual reading of the Fifth Amend-
ment's due process clause as likewise banning invidious racial dis-
crimination. Harlan understands this, as evidenced by his very next
sentence: "Those guarantees ... must be enforced in the courts, both of
the Nation and of the State, without reference to considerations based
upon race."1
2
A puzzle: In McCulloch, Marshall suggests that we read "neces-
sary" differently from "absolutely necessary," yet here, I suggest that
we read "due process" no differently from "due process plus equal pro-
tection." How can both be right? My answer: Where a particular
clause is best read as declaratory, glossing earlier words and making
explicit what these words only implied, the presence or absence of this
gloss should generally make no difference. If I tell my child "Do it - I
mean it!" the child should not automatically assume that when I
merely say "Do it!" I don't mean it. (The situation might be different
if the child and I were playing a variant of the game Simon Says.)
Thus, when the Constitution says to states "Do due process (which of
course includes doing equal protection)!" we should not automatically
assume that when it says to the federal government "Do due process!"
it must mean something different. Marshall himself thought that dif-
ferent wording might be a sign of different meaning, but not always.
Otherwise, we could not explain his view that the Necessary and
Proper Clause itself might merely be a clarifying gloss, with the enu-
merated powers properly read in exactly the same way whether or not
the gloss was present.
5. Roe. - Consider next what most lawyers and citizens - even
its many critics - would deem the most prominent judicial landmark
of the modern, post-Brown, post-Warren Court era: Roe v. Wade."
3
The opinion of the Court in Roe is often viewed as notably uncon-
cerned about constitutional text. Substantive due process? The very
III Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 59i (1896).
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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phrase teeters on the edge of textual self-contradiction. Indeed, in
perhaps the most famous passage in the entire opinion, Justice Black-
mun seems almost uninterested in the precise textual location of the
abortion right he announces. Whether the right of privacy "be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment[]" is not particularly im-
portant to him. 114 What is important, Blackmun says, is that wher-
ever this privacy right is grounded, it "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 15 And
here is another striking fact about Roe: although Justice Blackmun
quotes extensively from a great many sources - the Hippocratic
Oath,' 16 various reports and pronouncements of the American Medical
Association, 117 the standards adopted by the American Public Health
Association,"" utterances of the American Bar Association," 9 and
much more120 - he never actually gets around to quoting the precise
operative words of Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet for all this apparent disregard of the text, it would be a mistake
to think that Roe utterly ignores the words of the Constitution. In one
noteworthy but often unnoticed passage in his opinion, Justice Black-
mun lavishes attention on the document itself, invoking a cluster of
constitutional clauses in a single paragraph. Even more remarkably,
the passage is not simply a standard example of clause-bound textual-
ism, but a classically intratextualist exegesis. The question that
prompts this exegesis is simple: is a fetus a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment? If so, Blackmun argues, it would
follow that the Amendment would affirmatively protect the fetus's
right to life, and that the argument for a constitutional right to abor-
tion would "of course, collapse[]."1'2 To answer the question of fetal
personhood, Justice Blackmun turns not to an ordinary dictionary, but
to the Constitution itself as a dictionary:
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section I of
the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The
first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in the
United States." The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause
and in the Equal Protection Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the
114 Id. at 153.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 130-31.
117 See id. at 141-44.
118 See id. at 144-46.
119 See id. at 146-47.
120 See id. at 136-41 (discussing the general evolution of abortion rules under English statutory
law and American law).




Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Sena-
tors, Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and § 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3; in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, § 9, cl. i; in
the Emolument Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions, Art. II,
§ I, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications
for the office of President, Art. 1, § I, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions,
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the
Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use
of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indi-
cates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.
All this, together with our observation ... that throughout the major
portion of the I9th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far
freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.'
22
At least in form, Blackmun seems to outMarshall Marshall and
outStory Story in his enthusiastic embrace of intratextualism, pointing
to more than a dozen different constitutional clauses that use the same
word. He places particular emphasis on the intratextual link between
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Census Clause, noting in a foot-
note that "[w]e are not aware that in the taking of any census under
this clause, a fetus has ever been counted."1 23 What's sauce for the
Census Clause should be sauce for the Fourteenth Amendment.
A Roe critic, however, might challenge this approach. Sometimes
the same word does sensibly mean different things in different con-
texts, and nowhere is this more plausible than with a chameleon word
like "person." Corporations, for example, do not count as "persons"
under the Census Clause, and yet they count as "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment, entitled to due process and equal protection.
What is needed in Roe, but what is arguably missing, is an implicit or
explicit argument that the context of, say, the Census Clause is suffi-
ciently similar to that of the abortion question at hand. For example,
what would the Court say to a critic who points out that census takers
are not medical experts capable of detecting pregnancy (especially in
its early stages) whereas doctors are precisely such experts with train-
ing and equipment that allows them to know a fetus when they see
one? 124
Even if the critic is correct, this would not mean that the intratex-
tual technique itself is somehow improper or obsolete. All legitimate
constitutional techniques can be used well or used poorly, and perhaps
Roe's use of the legitimate technique of intratextualism is more
wooden and less compelling than McCulloch's and Martin's. In
122 Id. at 157-58 (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 157 n.53.
124 Note that the law at issue in Roe heaped its criminal sanctions not on the pregnant woman
but on doctors and third parties. See id. at 117 n.i, I51 & n.49, 158 n.4.
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McCulloch, for example, Marshall's ace - the intratextual link be-
tween the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Territories Clause -
played so well precisely because, on closer inspection, the two clauses
are remarkably similar in their logic as well as their language. Both
clauses confer (or confirm) generous congressional power to regulate.
Marshall's other intratextual argument, based on the word "absolutely"
in the Imposts Clause, sought to prove only that "necessary" could
mean useful, not that it must mean that. The remainder of Marshall's
argument was that we should choose the more spacious reading of the
word because such a reading makes more practical and structural
sense, and fits better with other words in the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Blackmun by contrast is seeking to convince us that "person"
must mean a postnatal human. This is a tougher task, perhaps re-
quiring more argument than he offers. In Martin, Story's two cleanest
examples of intratextualism worked so brilliantly because a general
popular sovereignty theme does indeed bridge the language of the Pre-
amble and the Tenth Amendment; 125 and the Vesting Clauses do in-
deed interlock, a design evidenced not merely by their parallel phras-
ing and parallel placement but also by the larger unifying theory of
separate and coordinate powers underlying these interconnected
clauses. In short, as we shall see in more detail in Parts II and III, in-
tratextual argument works best when it coheres with other types of
constitutional argument and. is part of a larger constitutional vision. If
Roe's intratextualism is a bit weak, could this be part of a more gen-
eral methodological weakness and inadequacy of constitutional vision
in the opinion as a whole?
Consider for example the assumption that launches Justice Black-
mun's intratextual excursion: if the fetus is a Fourteenth Amendment
"person," the argument for a constitutional right of a woman to control
her own body would "of course, collapse[]."' 126 But this need not "of
course" follow. A five-year-old girl is surely a Fourteenth Amendment
"person" - and is most definitely counted under the Census Clause -
but this fact does not necessarily mean that if she needs a kidney
transplant to save her life and the only available donor is her father,
then the father must give up his kidney. If a state tried to force the fa-
ther to do so, the issue of her life versus his liberty would not "of
course" be answered merely by insisting that she is a "person," consti-
tutionally speaking. He is a person too, and much more would need to
be said before we could reach sound constitutional conclusions here.
What is true for the liberty of the father is of course also true for the
liberty of the mother. And 'what is true of the kidney of the mother of
a five-year-old girl could well be true of the uterus of the mother of a
125 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 119-22.
126 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
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five-week-old fetus. In both cases, the state is seeking to force the
adult to sacrifice her bodily liberty and body parts to sustain the life of
her offspring.127 The foregoing points are only sharpened when what
is at stake is not merely the mother's liberty interest in controlling her
own body but also her interest in preserving her own life. In a foot-
note Justice Blackmun suggests that if a fetus is indeed a Fourteenth
Amendment "person," a state could probably not allow abortion even
to save the life of the mother. Would not such a pro-mother rule "ap-
pear to be out of line with the [Fourteenth] Amendment's command?"
he asks.128 The only thing out of line here, I suggest, is Justice Black-
mun's convoluted logic. Does he believe that when the law allows
parents to withhold their kidneys from dying children - as is the gen-
eral and perhaps universal rule in the states today - this law is "out
of line with the [Fourteenth] Amendment's command?" Where a
mother's life is at stake, what exactly in the Fourteenth Amendment
would prevent the state from allowing her to save herself, even at the
expense of the "person" she is carrying inside her?
The problems of Roe at this point merely reflect its larger inatten-
tion to the precise language of the Fourteenth Amendment, a lapse we
have already noted. But Roe's use of other techniques of constitu-
tional argument is not much better. Roe features an extraordinarily
expansive historical narrative129 - a Cecil B. DeMille production
ranging across centuries and continents - but the point of this grand
tour is far from clear. There is no clean argument from the "original
intent" of the Founding generation, or the Reconstructors, or the suf-
fragists; and there is no strong tradition of immunity from state regula-
tion that emerges with any clarity. If Blackmun means to offer up an
account of the American ethos, erudite accounts of the ancient Greeks
127 It is possible to imagine an omission/commission distinction here, but such a distinction
would be problematic in considering a nine-month pregnancy involving tightly intertwined acts
and omissions. If a woman engages in otherwise ordinary activities that threaten the health of the
fetus - smoking, drinking, overexercising, and so on - are these "actions" really so different
from the "inactions" of refusing to eat properly, or to take needed vitamins? What if, prior to con-
ception, the woman has had doctors place under her skin a hormone-affecting implant that, unless
actively removed, will cause the death of the fetus? Should we legally and morally distinguish
between ingesting a pill that will withhold the mother's biological life-support from the fetus, and
refusing to ingest a pill needed to save the life of the fetus?
Note also that in one of the most significant moral actions undertaken by parents-to-be - the
sex act itself - men and women may not be identically situated. Sex in the absence of full con-
sent by the woman is much more common than sex in the absence of full consent by the man.
Thus one could argue that conscription of fathers' kidneys is actually easier to justify than con-
scription of mothers' wombs. By discussing kidneys rather than violinists, I mean to avoid some
of the criticisms that Judge Posner, in the pages of this Law Review, has recently leveled at the
famous abortion analysis offered by Judith Jarvis Thompson. See Richard Posner, The Problem-
atics of Moral and Legal Theory, ii HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1675-76 (1998) (critiquing Judith Jarvis
Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, I PML. & PUB. AFF. 47 (97i)).
128 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54.
129 See id. at 129-47.
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and Romans seem somewhat beside the point without a tighter link to
the New World. Of course, Roe's main emphasis is neither textual,
nor historical, nor structural, nor prudential, nor ethical: it is doctrinal.
But here too it is a rather unimpressive effort. As a precedent-
follower, Roe simply stringcites a series of privacy cases involving
marriage, procreation, contraception, bedroom reading, education, and
other assorted topics, and then abruptly announces with no doctrinal
analysis that this privacy right "is broad enough to encompass" abor-
tion. 130 Ipse dixit. But as the Court itself admits a few pages later,
the existence of the living fetus makes the case at hand "inherently dif-
ferent" 131 - the italics here are mine - from every single one of these
earlier-invoked cases. And as a precedent-setter, the Court creates an
elaborate trimester framework that has struck many critics as visibly
(indeed, nakedly) ad hoc -more legislative than judicial.
In the end, Roe's many methodological lapses are simply evidence
that the best theory supporting its result - a theory emphasizing gen-
der and the particular ways in which abortion laws burden the liberty
and equality of women1 32 -- was not easily accessible to the Court in
1973. In light of these lapses, what are we to make of Roe's excursion
into intratextualism? Just this: Justice Blackmun's use of intratextual
argument is, methodologically speaking, one of Roe's more impressive
moments. Though hurried and unreflective, Roe's exuberant use of
intratextualism is considerably more clever than its rather clumsy use
of other types of constitutional argument elsewhere.1 33 What's more,
although dissenting Justices in Roe and later cases have sharply at-
tacked much of Justice Blackmun's opinion, none has ever challenged
his intratextual argument that a fetus is not a constitutional "person."
On this point, it seems the Justices are unanimous, bringing this part
of Roe further in line with other landmarks like Marbury, McCulloch,
and Brown. In any event, even if some critics were to find Justice
Blackmun's intratextual argument unpersuasive or incomplete, none
should miss its prominence in this landmark opinion. Intratextualism
lives.
B. Commentaries
Constitutional argument takes place outside courtrooms as well as
inside them. Is the intratextual technique somehow unique to judges
130 Id. at 153.
131 Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
132 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928-29 & n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (analyzing abortion
laws from the perspective of women's equality, and citing works by Professors Laurence Tribe,
Reva Siegel, Cass Sunstein, Catharine MacKinnon, and Jed Rubenfeld).
133 A critic might concede that Roe's use of intratextualism is "clever," but might see it as "too
clever by half' - more clever than wise or sound. For a more general discussion of this criticism,
see section II.D below at pages 799-8oi.
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and courtroom advocates? To answer this question, we could examine
several possible sites of constitutional discourse: constitutional argu-
ment on the floor of Congress, constitutional analysis inside the execu-
tive branch, constitutional conversation among ordinary citizens (over
the Internet, on street corners, at mass rallies, in jury rooms, and else-
where), constitutional scholarship by nonlawyers (historians, political
scientists, economists, and so on), and constitutional commentary of
law professors. I propose to examine legal scholarship because consti-
tutional argument here is continuous (whereas mass citizen involve-
ment is often minimal in times of "ordinary politics'), public (unlike a
good deal of internal executive branch analysis), deep (in a way that
constitutional debates among Webster and Clay and Calhoun were
deep, and that congressional debates today rarely are), and distinc-
tively legal (in contrast to academic work produced outside law
schools).
x. Ely. - Consider John Hart Ely's modern classic, Democracy
and Distrust,3 4 perhaps the most widely read work of constitutional
law of the last three decades. Early on, Ely argues that we must reject
narrow clause-bound textualism because the Constitution contains
various broadly worded clauses that, if read in isolation, stand as
empty vessels into which vast content might be poured but from
which little determinate meaning can be drawn.135 Included in this
category are the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the un-
enumerated rights language of the Ninth Amendment, and the various
clauses of Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Ely,
we cannot responsibly ignore these hugely important clauses, nor
should we go beyond the Constitution in search of fundamental values
hors de texte. What, then, do we do? Ely's proposed solution to this
puzzle is to read the broad clauses in light of the general themes of the
Constitution as a whole. 136 Ely does not specifically suggest that we
attend to the patterns of words and phrases that repeat themselves in
the document. But if his general methodological prescription is not
quite intratextualism, as I have defined it, it is rather close. Like in-
tratextualism, Ely's approach invites textualists to read clauses holisti- (
cally, rather than in isolated, clause-bound fashion. Ely thinks that
there are indeed larger patterns and structures implicit in the docu-
ment as a whole and that careful examination of the entire text is the
proper starting point for analysis.
What's more, in applying his general methodology, Ely repeatedly
(though with minimal methodological fanfare) gestures toward in-
tratextualism. In his important chapter on the open-textured
134 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (198o).
135 See id. at 11-41.
136 See id. at 87-101.
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clauses, 137 Ely makes at least six intratextual moves. First, he places
the similarly worded Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments side by side for careful analysis. 138 In light of the obvi-
ous parallels of language here, this is a quite conventional move (as we
saw in Bolling) and a sound one. Next, he analyzes the Fourteenth
Amendment clause protecting "privileges" and "immunities" of "citi-
zens" alongside the Article IV clause containing the same three clus-
tered words, noting both the linguistic similarities and the important
syntactical differences between these two nonadjacent clauses. 139 This
maneuver in turn leads him to contrast the substantive rights language
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause with
the equal rights language of its Equal Protection Clause. 140 Here too,
Ely's moves are enlightened. and enlightening.
His invocation of Article IV is especially promising, for there is
even more insight to be gained by pondering its intratextualist links to
the Fourteenth Amendment than Ely himself suggests. For example,
we might at first be puzzled by the fact that every single one of the
major proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 denied that
voting was a "privilege" or "immunity" of "citizens.' 14' Viewed in iso-
lation, the words hardly seem to demand this reading. But under Ar-
ticle IV, a Massachusetts man temporarily visiting South Carolina
could claim equality of civil rights - like the rights to own real prop-
erty or to profess his religion - but not equality of political rights.
Thus, he could be barred from voting in South Carolina elections, or
serving on a South Carolina jury. With this understanding of Article
IV in mind, we can see more clearly why the proponents of the Four-
teenth Amendment insisted that its words would likewise encompass
civil but not political rights. This is precisely the intratextual move at
the heart of the Supreme Court's 1875 opinion in Minor v. Happer-
sett,142 holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer suf-
frage rights:
But if further proof is necessary to show [that the right to vote is not
one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship in the Fourteenth
Amendment,] it can easily be found.., in... the Constitution. By Article
4, Section 2, it is provided that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." If
suffrage is necessarily a part of citizenship, then the citizens of each State
must be entitled to vote in the several States precisely as their citizens
are.... This, we think, has never been claimed.'
43
137 See id. at 11-41.
138 See id. at 1 5 .
139 See id. at 23-24.
140 See id. at 24.
141 For documentation, see AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, cited above in note 95, at 2 17 n.*.
142 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (875).
143 Id. at 174.
[VOL. 112:747
INTRATEXTUALISM
Consider next Ely's intratextual comparison of the use of the word
"citizens" in one Fourteenth Amendment clause with the use of the dif-
ferent word "person" in neighboring Fourteenth Amendment
clauses. 144 This is a linguistic point that many less sensitive readers of
the Amendment have simply missed. Whether or not we ultimately
embrace Ely's particular conclusions here,145 we should applaud his
methodological instincts. An attractive account of the Fourteenth
Amendment should explain, rather than ignore, the intratextual con-
trast he notes.
In his next (fifth) intratextual gesture, Ely juxtaposes the language
of the Fifteenth Amendment - which explicitly limits "the United
States" as well as states - with the omission of similar language in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 46  Ely suggests that this juxtaposition rein-
forces the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot sensibly be
read to require federal officials to obey its command of equal protec-
tion. Given our earlier analysis of Boiling, we can see that Ely is
wrong about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but right in
his instinct to examine the Bolling issue intratextually.
Finally, we should note that Ely reads the language of the Ninth
Amendment in light of the language of the Tenth. 147  Once again, we
need not agree in every respect with his substantive conclusions in or-
der to admire his style and concur with his methodological insight that
sound interpretation of the Ninth Amendment must take account of its
relation to the Tenth Amendment. 48  Though he does not stress the
point, the fact that these adjoining Amendments feature similar
phrases - of rights and powers "reserved" and "retained" by "the peo-
ple" - invites careful intratextual scrutiny.
Taken as a whole, the appearance of so many intratextual moves in
so short a space (twenty pages) suggests that our best constitutional
scholars are as fluent in intratextualism at the end of the twentieth
century as were Marshall and Story at the beginning of the nine-
teenth.
49
144 See ELY, supra note 134, at 24-25.
145 For a different account, critiquing Ely, see AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, cited above in note 95,
at 171-74, 364-65 n.42.
146 See ELY, supra note 134, at 33.
147 See id. at 34-35.
148 For my own thoughts here, see AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, cited above in note 95, at 119-24.
149 Several of our youngest generation of constitutional scholars have offered prominent and
attractive examples of intratextualism. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1175-86
(1992) (providing extensive intratextual analysis of the Vesting Clauses); Vikram D. Amar, Jury
Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 8o CORNELL L. REV. 203, 222-46 (1995) (pro-
viding extensive intratexual analysis of various similarly worded voting amendments) [hereinafter
Vikram Amar]. Our most prominent constitutional scholar and litigator has also recently used
intratextualism in a particularly powerful and elegant way to address one of the most important
constitutional issues of the last quarter-century. See Laurence Tribe, Dialogue: The Independent
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2. Langdell and Lowell. - If Professor Ely's book illustrates in-
tratextualism at work in contemporary legal scholarship, what about
legal scholarship in its early years? Consider a pair of articles that ap-
peared in the pages of this Law Review exactly one hundred years ago,
in volumes 12 and 13.1-0 As the low volume numbers remind us, these
articles sprang up at the (lawn of law school scholarship. Their
authors were eminent figures: Christopher Columbus Langdell, the
former dean and father of the modern Harvard Law School (and
holder of the Dane Professorship that Justice Story first held), and A.
Lawrence Lowell, who would soon become President of Harvard Uni-
versity (a post he would hold for more than three decades). Both arti-
cles addressed constitutional issues of great moment, issues that prom-
ised to define the upcoming presidential election of 19oo, and that
would give rise to a hugely important (yet today almost forgotten) set
of Supreme Court decisions in I9oI. l s x The constitutional questions at
issue were these: How (if at all) did the Constitution apply to territo-
ries beyond state borders? How (if at all) was America's turn-of-the-
century ambition for empire, as evidenced by the 1898 Spanish-
American War, to be squared with a Constitution born in an anti-
imperial revolution and dedicated to principles of popular sovereignty
and self-determination?15 2  Were inhabitants of Puerto Rico and the
Philippines entitled to all the protections of the Constitution? In pop
jargon, did the Constitution "follow the flag"? Exactly one century af-
ter the Langdell and Lowell articles, the federal government and the
inhabitants of Puerto Rico are still struggling with these questions.
Modern constitutional scholarship has slighted these issues, and so the
Langdell and Lowell articles (and the related Insular Cases of i9O1)
receive less attention than they deserve. Today, however, my interest
is more methodological than substantive: what do these classic articles
Counsel, SLATE (Oct. I, 1998) <http://www.slate.com> (online discussion with Akhil Reed Amar)
(analyzing the Article II, Section 4 Impeachment Clause phrase, "Treason, Bribery, or other High
Crimes and Misdemeanors," by intratextual contrast with the Article I, Section 6 Arrest Clause
phrase, "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace," and the Article IV, Section 2 Interstate Extra-
dition Clause phrase, "Treason, Felony or other Crime").
15o See C. C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REv. 365 (1899); Abbott
Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions - A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155
(1899).
151 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 248-85 (19Oi) (considering whether duties imposed on
items imported from Puerto Rico were valid after the United States acquired Puerto Rico as a
territory, and "the broader question of whether the revenue clauses extend of their own force to
our newly acquired territories"); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 23o-36 (i9oi) (examining
the validity of various duties imposed on goods imported from the United States to Puerto Rico
after the military took possession of the island); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 174 (19oi) (con-
sidering whether a United States territory acquired from a foreign power constituted a "foreign
country" for the purposes of tariff law).
152 In Bobbitt's terminology, see BOBBiTT, supra note 9, at 93-119, isn't there a strong ethical
argument, deeply rooted in the Founding saga of America, that condemns imperial exploitation of
colonies for mere commercial advantage?
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tell us about the way that early legal scholars debated constitutional
questions?
In the title and opening paragraph of his January 1899 article,
Langdell asserts that to properly assess "the status of our new territo-
ries," we must "ascertain the meaning of the term 'United States. "'153
In casual conversation and international affairs, he admits, the term
may encompass federal territories governed, by the national govern-
ment, as well as the various (then, forty-five) states of the Union.
5 4
But, he boldly argues, the term as used in the Constitution excludes
territories altogether and encompasses only the several states:
[T]he Constitution of the United States as such does not extend beyond the
limits of the States which are united by and under it, - a proposition the
truth of which will, it is believed, be placed beyond doubt by an examina-
tion of the instances in which the term "United States" is used in the Con-
stitution.15s s
What follows over the next six pages is an exhaustive - and exhaust-
ing - intratextualist extravaganza in which Langdell tries to identify
every single constitutional clause (more than fifty in all) using the
phrase "United States."
Over the course of these six pages, Langdell makes several fine-
grained intratextualist claims. He begins with the opening phrase of
the Preamble, "We, the People of the United States." Because only
Americans in the thirteen states ratified the Constitution, Langdell ar-
gues that the phrase "United States" here cannot refer to Americans
outside states (such as those residing in the Northwest Territory in the
late 1780s): "According to the Preamble, therefore, the Constitution is
limited to the thirteen States which were united under the Articles of
Confederation .... "156
A couple of pages later, Langdell turns to the phrase "throughout
the United States." s5 7 This phrase lay at the nub of various economic
debates over the Philippines and Puerto Rico. If the federal govern-
ment were to annex these territories and treat them as colonies, with a
mercantile regime of special colonial taxes and tariffs, could such
treatment be squared with Article I, Section 8's Tax Uniformity
Clause, which demands that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States"? 5 8 To answer this question,
Langdell turns to the two other clauses of the Constitution featuring
153 Langdell, supra note i5o, at 365.
154 See id. at 371.
155 Id. at371.
156 Id. at 373.
157 Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. i. Note how, on one reading, this seemingly technical clause
could be understood as a sweeping textual affirmation of America's anticolonialist, antimercantil-
ist ethos - a promise that Americans would never treat others as the British had once treated
them. See supra note 152.
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the identical phrase, "throughout the United States." One of these
other clauses - the Article II, Section i clause empowering Congress
to pick the day on which presidential electors shall be chosen
"throughout the United States"'5 9 - cannot possibly apply outside the
states, Langdell argues. And what's sauce for the Article II Presiden-
tial Election Day Clause, he claims, should be sauce for the similarly
worded Article I Tax Uniformity Clause. Thus, neither clause applies
in any way beyond the several states. In his words, "when the same
phrase is used in different parts of the Constitution, a strong presump-
tion arises that it is always used in the same sense. '160  This is in-
tratextualism with a vengeance.
But with dubious constitutional judgment. Consider Langdell's
claims about the Preamble. True, Americans in the Northwest Terri-
tory did not vote to ratify tie Constitution - but neither did women.
If, in theory, the men in the thirteen state ratifying conventions virtu-
ally represented women, perhaps these conventions likewise virtually
represented Americans in the Northwest, who, in theory, were indeed
part of "We the People of the United States" from the beginning. Can
Langdell truly mean it when he says that under the Preamble, "the
Constitution is limited to the ... States?"1 61 If so, the Article VI Su-
premacy Clause, which speaks of the "Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States," simply does not apply in Washington, D.C. (Given
that this is where Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court all
do their work, this result seems troubling, to put it mildly.) In a brief
aside, Langdell appears to soften his point by suggesting that the "Dis-
trict of Columbia differs materially from a Territory, [because] the
former is within the limits of a State, was once part of a State, and,
therefore, the Constitution once extended over it; and it may not be
easy to show that it has ever ceased to extend over it. ' ' 162 But even if
we bracket the District, is it sound to think that the words of the Su-
premacy Clause (and of the rest of the Constitution, for that matter)
are simply inapplicable in territories destined for statehood, such as
Arizona in r899?163 Contrast Langdell's crabbed view with Marshall's
expansive attitude eighty years earlier, when, as we have already
noted, the Chief Justice proclaimed that the vast American "republic"
159 U.S. CONST. art. II, § i, cl. 4.
160 Langdell, supra note 15o, at 375.
161 Id. at 373.
162 Id. at 382-83.
163 Another anomaly: An American who was born in Michigan in, say, 18o8 and spent his en-
tire life there would apparently have been ineligible to be President at age forty because he had
not been "fourteen Years a Resident within the United States" within the meaning of Article II,
Section i, Clause 5. (Michigan was part of the original Northwest Territory in 1787, was organ-
ized as a separate territory in 1805, and became a state in 1837.) For a fun exploration of these
and related complexities, see generally Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking
Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential
Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1995).
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extends "from the St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico, from the Atlantic
to the Pacific"'164 - most definitely encompassing territories that were
not yet states. Writing only a year after McCulloch in a case arising
under the Article I, Section 8 clause demanding that federal taxes be
"uniform throughout the United States," Marshall spoke to the issue
with more precision: "[The United States] is the name given to our
great republic, which is composed of States and territories. The dis-
trict of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less
within the United States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania."
165
Compare this to Langdell's intratextualist claim about the phrase
"throughout the United States." True, this Article I Tax Uniformity
Clause phrase also appears in the Article II Presidential Election Day
Clause, which originally applied only in states (because only states
chose presidential electors). But this Article II clause proves only that
the phrase sometimes can sensibly mean "throughout the several
states," not that it must always mean this. (Langdell here resembles
Blackmun more than Marshall.) And what is really doing the terri-
tory-excluding work in this Article H clause is not the contested phrase
itself, but the general context involving the electoral college. The Tax
Uniformity Clause has nothing to do with this context, and so argua-
bly it need not be read in the same way. Here is another way to put
this point: after the adoption of the Twenty-Third Amendment in
I96i, the voters in Washington, D.C., became part of the electoral col-
lege system, and so the Article II phrase "throughout the United
States" now does clearly apply beyond the several states. The same
thing would have been true if, in i9oo, the country had adopted a con-
stitutional amendment allowing Americans in the Arizona Territory to
choose presidential electors. And all this makes clear that there is
nothing in the simple phrase, "throughout the United States," that bars
application beyond states, if such application is otherwise indicated by
context.
More generally, the words "United States" may well be an un-
promising prospect for intratextualism - or at least for an intratextu-
alism that seeks a definitive answer to the territories question. Like
the word "person," the phrase may be a clever chameleon whose pre-
cise hue will sensibly vary depending on the surrounding legal context.
If we seek to go beyond a narrow clause-bound analysis, it seems inapt
to limit our holistic textualism to those constitutional clauses that, for
random reasons, happen to use the phrase "United States." Rather, we
should examine the document as a whole, and its animating ideals.
And when we do, the idea that the Constitution would not apply at all
164 McCulloch v. Maryland, i7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,408 (18ig).
165 Loughborough v. Blake, i8 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319 (1820).
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to territories on the road to statehood - such as Michigan in 182o and
Arizona in 1899 - seems outlandish.
This is precisely the point Lowell makes at the outset of his power-
ful reply to Langdell in the November 1899 issue of the Harvard Law
Review. He observes:
[The Langdell thesis] allows Congress to confiscate property in the District
of Columbia or in a Territory without compensation, or to take it arbitrar-
ily from the owner and bestow it upon another person. It suffers the gov-
ernment to pass a bill of attainder against a resident of Washington or of
Arizona, and order him hung without trial. According to this view,
moreover, a person born of alien parents in a Territory is not a citizen of
the United States either by the Constitution or by statute .... 166
But even in the course of rejecting Langdell's outlandish thesis, Lowell
himself repeatedly makes intratextualist arguments. In the above-
quoted passage for example, Lowell is implicitly arguing that the Four-
teenth Amendment's first sentence most assuredly does encompass ter-
ritories like Arizona in its sweeping grant of birthright citizenship to
"[a]ll persons born ... in the United States." Elsewhere, Lowell makes
more explicit his claim that on various occasions the Constitution does
use the phrase "United States" in clear contemplation of territories. If
"United States" really means "several states," he asks, why doesn't the
document use the latter phrase? Indeed, because in some clauses the
document does use the latter phrase, shouldn't we assume that when
the different phrase "United States" is used, something different was
intended? (This is the standard flip side of the intratextualist coin.)167
Lowell's use of intratextualism is considerably more adroit than
Langdell's. For starters, the clauses that Lowell chooses to yoke to-
gether seem to share more context, making his clausal comparisons
166 Lowell, supra note 15o, at 156-57.
167 In Lowell's words:
[Iln the first clause of Art. I., Sect. 2, for example, the Constitution speaks of "the People of
the several States," and in the next clause a representative is required to be a "Citizen of
the United States." Why this change of expression if a different meaning is not intended?
... Again, it is provided that "direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers;" but that
"all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." If the
intention had been merely that these last taxes should be uniform throughout the States,
while direct taxes were to be apportioned among them according to population, the fram-
ers of the Constitution would no doubt have said so. The same remark applies to the pro-
visions requiring laws of naturalization and bankruptcy to be uniform throughout the
United States, and to the clause prescribing that the President shall have "been fourteen
years a Resident within the United States." It may be observed in this connection that if
no one can be a citizen of one of the United States unless he is a citizen of the States, then
foreigners can become citizens only by being naturalized in a State, and Congress either
had no power to extend the naturalization laws over the Territories, or persons naturalized
there acquire none of the rights of citizens.
Id. at 159-6o (emphasis added).
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seem less contrived.168 More generally, Lowell seems to recognize the
limits of intratextual analysis as well as its strengths. Perhaps some
uses of a phrase as protean as "United States," he suggests, might be
"inadverten[t]."'169 And Lowell understands that the key constitutional
issues at hand are not best addressed by looking only, or even primar-
ily, at constitutional clauses that happen to use this phrase. Thus he
scores some of his most telling points by pondering clauses that do not
use this talismanic phrase, yet nevertheless speak volumes to the ques-
tion whether the Constitution applies outside the states:
Art. iT., Sect. 2, Cl. 3, provides, for instance, that "The trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." This by its very terms
applies to crimes committed outside of any State, and the provision was so
framed with that very object. Another clause, speaking of members of
Congress, provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place." Surely this cannot mean only
in any place within a State, for it would lose its whole value if a member
could be sued or prosecuted in the District of Columbia on a charge of Li-
bellous statements in Congress.
17"
In the end, the Langdell-Lowell exchange evidences the promi-
nence of intratextualism at the dawn of constitutional scholarship in
places like the Harvard Law School. The exchange also reminds us
that, as is true of all other legitimate techniques of constitutional inter-
pretation, intratextualism can often be used on both sides of contested
questions, and with varying degrees of deftness. In particular, Lang-
dell's form of intratextualism should powerfully remind us of the dan-
gers of mechanical formalism in deploying the technique, even as
Lowell's form suggests more optimistic possibilities.
168 Consider the passage quoted above in note 167. Precisely because the clauses that he points
to in Article I, Section 2 stand back to back in the Constitution itself, the textual contrast he iden-
tifies seems potentially significant. And when he pairs the Direct Tax Clause of Article I, Section
2 with the Tax Uniformity Clause of the nonadjacent Article I, Section 8, the pairing seems highly
plausible, linking clauses that obviously address the same subject (taxation). From this Tax Uni-
formity Clause, Lowell's next intratextual leap to the nonadjacent naturalization and bankruptcy
uniformity clause also seems manageable - not because both clauses use the same bland and un-
promising phrase "throughout the United States," but because both clauses seem plausibly to be
about the same principle of national uniformity. (Langdell also seems to appreciate this point.
See Langdell, supra note i5o, at 38o.) Lowell subtly reinforces the implicit substantive basis for
his intratextual leap by closing this paragraph with an illustration of the oddities that would re-
sult from a nonuniform federal naturalization power.
169 Lowell, supra note 15o, at 158.
170 Id. at 16o. Lowell follows these two examples with a third from the Fifteenth Amendment.
Though this Amendment does use the phrase "United States," he places no emphasis on this fact.
Instead, he stresses that its ban on race discrimination in voting, insofar as this ban applies to fed-
eral officials, applies beyond states - in the territories and the District of Columbia - because
these are the only places where the federal government is empowered to regulate suffrage. See id.
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This concludes my selective survey of canonical cases and commen-
taries. Thus far I hope I have shown that intratextualism is a stan-
dard tool in the kitbag of the capable constitutional lawyer, a tool that
can come in handy over a remarkably broad range of constitutional is-
sues. Even in historical instances where the tool was not used, it often
could have been used, and used powerfully. Of course, I do not claim
that intratextualism is the only or even the best form of constitutional
argument, or that it will work in every important case. I do claim that
good constitutional lawyers neglect this tool at their peril.
Having seen intratextualism in action and inaction across a wide
range of specific issues, let us now see if something a bit more general
can be said about this form of argument - its distinctiveness, its
variations, its strengths, and its weaknesses.
II. THEORY
A. The Distinctiveness of Intratextualism
Is intratextualism methodologically distinct from the other standard
forms of constitutional argument? In important respects, yes. Textual
argument as typically practiced today is blinkered ("clause-bound" in
Ely's terminology17 1), focusing intently on the words of a given consti-
tutional provision in splendid isolation. By contrast, intratextualism
always focuses on at least two clauses and highlights the link between
them. Clause-bound textualism paradigmatically stresses what is ex-
plicit in the Constitution's text: "See here, it says X!" By contrast, in-
tratextualism paradigmatically stresses what is only implicit in the
Constitution's text: "See here, these clauses fit together!" But there is
no clause in the Constitution that says, explicitly and in so many
words, that the three Vesting Clauses should be construed together, or
that the Article III grant of federal question jurisdiction should be
read alongside the Article VI Supremacy Clause. Intratextualism sim-
ply reads the Constitution as if these implicit linking clauses existed.
Clause-bound textualism reads the words of the Constitution in order,
tracking the sequence of clauses as they appear in the document itself.
By contrast, intratextualism often reads the words of the Constitution
in a dramatically different order, placing textually nonadjoining
clauses side by side for careful analysis. In effect, intratextualists read
a two-dimensional parchment in a three-dimensional way, carefully
folding the parchment to bring scattered clauses alongside each other.
Clause-bound textualism itself comes in different varieties, but nei-
ther of the two main strands of textualism looks quite like intratextu-
alism. A plain-meaning textualist might look to today's dictionaries to
make sense of a contested term like "commerce" or "cruel" or "privi-
171 ELY, supra note 134, at 12.
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leges" or "process," whereas an original intent textualist might look to
eighteenth-century dictionaries. But intratextualism tries to use the
Constitution as its own dictionary of sorts, yielding a third distinct ap-
proach. An intratextualist might read mid-nineteenth-century consti-
tutional phrases like "due process" or "privileges or immunities of citi-
zens" in light of similar constitutional phrases written in the late
eighteenth century, or vice versa. Another example: does the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, protect the "right" of eighteen-year-
olds to "vote" in juries as well as in ordinary elections? Plain-meaning
and original-intent textualists would both consult the word "vote" in
modern usage and modern dictionaries, but an intratextualist would
use the Constitution as its own dictionary here. On no less than four
occasions - the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-
Sixth Amendments - the Constitution uses the same highly elaborate
set of words, "the right of citizens of the United States ... to vote,"
and an intratextualist would be inclined to read these provisions in
pari materia. Their strongly parallel language is a strong (presump-
tive) argument for parallel interpretation. If it seems clear (as, in fact,
it does) that the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, was drafted to
encompass the political right of citizens to serve and "vote" on juries,
this fact about word usage and constitutional meaning in 1870 would
be relevant to an intratextualist confronting a different (but parallel)
amendment adopted ioo years later.
172
For similar reasons, intratextualism also seems distinct from stan-
dard forms of argument based on history and original intent. An in-
tratextualist might say that the words "due process of law" in the Fifth
Amendment contain an equality component even though none of the
Amendment's drafters or ratifiers in the 178os and 1790s thought so.
True, those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did
think that the Fifth Amendment phrase implied an equality compo-
nent, but clause-bound practitioners of standard original intent analy-
sis would not ordinarily look to the Fourteenth to construe the Fifth.
And even though the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo-
rated their understanding of the words "due process of law" in a clari-
fying gloss, the equal protection words they drafted do not explicitly
apply to federal action. 173 (Here we see again the differences between
172 See Vikram Amar, supra note 149, at 222-41.
173 Note the possibility for certain kinds of cycles and Condorcet-like paradoxes here. Suppose
those who draft clause i at time Tz think it means X, and those who draft parallel clause 2 at
time T2 think it means Y. If we read clause i to mean X, and clause 2 to mean Y, we fall to do
justice to the implicit idea that the two clauses are in pari matefia. If we read both to mean Y, we
fail to do justice to the intent of drafters at Ti. Likewise, if we read both to mean X, we fall to do
justice to the drafters at Tz. One intentionalist approach to the paradox would be to pose a coun-
terfactual: if the drafters of clause 2 had been made aware of the cycle, would they have rewritten
clause i to mean Y, or would they upon reflection have decided that clause 2 should really mean
X, or would they have said that the two clauses should not be interpreted in pari materia?
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standard clause-bound textualism and intratextualism.) We should
also note that intratextualism draws inferences from the patterns of
words that appear in the Constitution even in the absence of other
evidence that these patterns were consciously intended. Just as in-
tratextualism, as a variant of textual argument, often focuses on what
is merely implicit in the text, so too intratextualism, as a variant of his-
torical argument, may highlight what is only presumed to be the spe-
cific intent.
It might be thought that intratextualism stands as a paradigmatic
species of structural argument. However, the most typical forms of
structural argument focus not on the words of the Constitution, but
rather on the institutional arrangements implied or summoned into
existence by the document - the relationship between the Presidency
and the Congress, or the balance between the House and the Senate,
or the interplay among sister states, or the direct bond between citizens
and the federal government. Indeed, the most elegant practitioner and
proponent of structural argument today, Professor Charles Black, has
explicitly defined his brand of reasoning in contradistinction to those
approaches that focus intently on text:
I am inclined to think well of the method of reasoning from structure and
relation ... above all, because to succeed, it has to make sense - current,
practical sense.... [Textualism] may often - perhaps more often than not
- be made to make sense, . .. [b]ut it contains within itself no guarantee
that it will make sense .... [Structural argument focuses us on] the prac-
ticalities and proprieties of the thing, without getting out dictionaries
whose entries will not really respond to the question we are putting ....
We will have to deal with policy and not with grammar.'
74
Of course, in important respects intratextualism does share much in
common with its sister forms of argument. Like clause-bound textu-
alism, it focuses on the words of the document. (And some forms of
clause-bound textualism - like negative-implication arguments based
on the interpretive maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius - do
squeeze meaning from what is merely implied, rather than explicitly
stated by the words themselves.) Like historical argument, intratextu-
alism often makes claims about the implicit intent of the Framers
based on their utterances. Like Blackian structuralism, intratextual-
ism seeks to identify and draw meaning from larger constitutional pat-
terns at work.'75 Like doctrinal argument, it seeks to promote a cer-
tain coherence in interpretation and avoid the appearance of ad hoc
adjudication; absent a good reason for doing otherwise, similar consti-
174 BLACK, supra note 22, at 22-23.
175 Cf id. at 31 ("There is, moreover, a close and perpetual interworking between the textual
and the relational and structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned are




tutional commands should be treated similarly for reasons analogous
to the doctrinal principle that like cases should be treated alike.
In the end, so long as we recognize intratextualism as a valuable
and important interpretive technique, while also recognizing its limita-
tions, it may not matter how we formally classify it. Indeed, instead of
viewing intratextualism as one distinct form of argument apart from
six others, it may be useful to consider intratextualism as a cluster of
at least three different kinds of constitutional claims.
B. The Types of Intratextualism
i. Using the Constitution as a Dictionary: Intratextualism as Phi-
lology. - Understood most literally, the idea of using the Constitution
as a dictionary can be seen as serving a linguistic function. A diction-
ary tells us what a word can mean, with examples drawn from usage.
Although the Constitution itself rarely defines a contested word self-
consciously the way a dictionary does, 17 6 the Constitution does illus-
trate word usage, and thus serves a basic dictionary function. Indeed,
the Constitution may be superior to ordinary dictionaries in several re-
spects. Ordinary dictionaries may diverge - I like the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED), you like Webster's - but the Constitution itself
provides a common reference point'" for all concerned: drafters com-
posing constitutional language, ratifiers deciding whether to make such
language supreme law, judges and other interpreters trying to expound
such language thereafter, and subsequent generations of would-be
amenders seeking to add postscripts to the prior text. Legal words and
phrases can sometimes be used as terms of art, with nuances of mean-
ing not well captured by standard dictionaries reflecting lay usage.
Often we seek the meaning of a word cluster - a phrase - rather
than of a single word, but ordinary dictionaries typically feature dis-
crete entries for individual words. In contrast, the Constitution often
offers up repeated use of similar word clusters, and these clustered
uses may prove especially rich veins of insight. For example, if the
key words of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment - "right," "citizens," and
"vote" - were examined as discrete entries in a standard late-
twentieth-century dictionary, it might seem dubious that these words,
when conjoined, encompass the right of jury service. But if we instead
consult the clustered use of these words as they first appeared in the
Constitution (in the Fifteenth Amendment), we find abundant evi-
dence that the phrase as a whole did indeed embrace the political right
176 But see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. JII, § 3 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only
in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.").
177 For a discussion of the concept of "focal points," see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57-80 (i960).
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to serve in the jury box and vote in the jury room. 78  The words
"privileges," "immunities," and "citizens" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provide another example. If we viewed these three words in
isolation and consulted ordinary dictionary entries, we would be hard-
pressed to explain how Reconstruction Republicans could be so em-
phatic and unanimous in their insistence that these words equaled
"civil rights" and excluded political rights like voting.179 But when we
instead turn to the clustered use of these three words in Article IV, h la
Happersett, we see the linguistic light (and link).
The lighter the load a given linguistic argument seeks to bear, the
easier it is to defend this particular brand of constitutional intratextu-
alism. If Marshall is seeking to establish only that "necessary" can
mean convenient, a single constitutional example suffices to prove his
point, and powerfully. By contrast, if Blackmun is seeking to prove
that "person" must mean post-natal humans, or if Langdell is seeking
to establish that "United States" can only mean the several states, even
a slew of examples from the Constitution may prove unavailing. It is
difficult to prove a universal linguistic negative with a less-than-
universal linguistic database.
The matter is different when we consult a standard unabridged
dictionary, like the multivolume OED, which purports to map exhaus-
tively the possible meanings of a word, from the universe of accepted
usage. If such a dictionary tells us that approved authors never (or
almost never) use the word "person" prenatally, this may be much
stronger evidence than if Blackmun tells us that outside the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Constitution itself in a dozen or so clauses
never uses the word this way. The more universal the database of
word usage, the more plausible the claim that a given word simply
cannot mean a certain thing. And so we are left with the following:
When we seek to prove that a word could mean X, a single example
from the Constitution illustrating this is stronger than an entry from a
standard dictionary because the example proves that the authors of the
Constitution itself - and not simply some "approved authors" some-
where - understood usage X. But if we try to prove that a word can-
not mean Y, examples drawn from the Constitution are weaker than
entries in standard dictionaries.
2. Using the Constitution as a Concordance: Intratextualism as
Pattern Recognition. - If philologic intratextualism is best at proving
what a word or phrase might mean, a differerent brand of intratextu-
alism tries to show what the document as a whole is best read as
meaning. Intratextualism allows the Constitution to function not
merely as a special kind of dictionary, but also as a special kind of
178 See Vikram Amar, supra note 149, at 222-41; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at
271-74 & n.*.
179 See supra p. 78o.
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concordance, enabling and encouraging us to place nonadjoining
clauses alongside each other for analysis because they use the same (or
very similar) words and phrases. Once we accept the invitation to
read noncontiguous provisions together, we may see important pat-
terns at work. This will not always be the case - various all-purpose
words may pop up in a random assortment of clauses that have little
in common with each other, and upon reflection we may even say that
certain chameleon words should sensibly mean different things in dif-
ferent clauses. But other times, the intratextual word link will be a
surface sign of a much deeper thematic connection, a sympathetic vi-
bration evidencing a rich harmony at work. Is it purely coincidental
that the last words of the Tenth Amendment intratextually echo the
first words of the Preamble? Story thought not, and after reflection
and analysis, we see that Story was right. Both passages are part of a
deep pattern, embroidering the fundamental constitutional principle of
popular sovereignty.180  (In fact, the last three words of the Amend-
ment were added by the First Congress in explicit recognition of their
connection to the Preamble. 181) Further evidence of this deep pattern
may be discerned when we ponder the fact - made easier to see by a
concordance brand of intratextualism - that no phrase appears in
more amendments in our cherished Bill of Rights than the phrase "the
people." 12 If we seek further confirmation of this pattern, we find it
in the power of Lincoln at Gettysburg, echoing Marshall, echoing
Story, echoing the Bill of Rights, echoing the Preamble:"... the peo-
ple,... the people,... the people."
Oftentimes the patterns will be ones that the drafters specifically
intended and that the ratifiers consciously considered - the inter-
locking words of the Article III grant of federal question jurisdiction
and the Article VI Supremacy Clause, for example, or the obvious
symmetry between the civil rights protected by the Article IV Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause on the one hand and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause on the other. Other
times, the pattern that we discern upon reflection may not have been
specifically intended, but is still far from random. Must Lincoln have
had Marshall specifically in mind to be indebted to him? A great play
may contain a richness of meaning beyond what was clearly in the
playwright's mind when the muse came; ordinary language contains
depths of association that not even our best poets fully understand,
180 For more general analysis of this pattern, see AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, cited above in note
95.
181 See id. at iig-i.
182 U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV, IX, X. Of course it is logically possible that "people" is an
essentially unimportant chameleon word, like "person." The intratextual issue can never be de-
cided a priori. Rather, intratextualism merely poses the question whether a deep analytic pattern
in fact ties together a repeated word or phrase, and to answer this question we will need to use
other tools of interpretation to supplement intratextualism.
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even as they intuit; and a judicial opinion may build better than its
author knew. So too with the Constitution. Those who drafted and
ratified the Article IV Territories Clause may not have consciously un-
derstood how perfectly its words ("The Congress shall have Power to
... make all needful Rules and Regulations") mirror those of the Arti-
cle I Necessary and Proper Clause ("The Congress shall have Power
... [t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper'). But the
pattern here is not constitutionally coincidental - monkeys randomly
striking typewriter keys would not have produced it. Patterns like this
are part of the genius of the document, and intratextualism can help us
see this genius.
But is this "genius of the Constitution" a genius of its writers or a
genius of its readers? The answer is, I think, both. As Jed Rubenfeld
has powerfully reminded us, American-style written constitutionalism
is a temporally extended intergenerational project calling for a sensi-
tive collaboration between generations of writers and later generations
of readers.18 3 A sensitive reader does not simply make things up, but
she does draw out meaning that may only be implicit in the text. And
the kind of meaning she draws out will depend on the purpose for
which she is reading. A great historian or deconstructionist might ap-
proach a great text in search of irony, polyphony, and even contradic-
tion. (Think of the genius of Duncan Kennedy when interpreting the
genius of Blackstone's Commentaries.18 4) A great literary critic or
classicist might read a text so as to reveal its artistic beauty. (Think of
the genius of Garry Wills when interpreting the genius of Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address.8 5 ) A great lawyer or judge reading the Constitu-
tion as law will look for something slightly different: consistency rather
than inconsistency, workability and ease of exposition to ordinary
Americans rather than sheer beauty in the eyes of aesthetes. (Think of
the genius of John Marshall in McCulloch when interpreting the ge-
nius of the Founders' Constitution.)
3. Using the Constitution as a Rulebook: Intratextualism as Prin-
ciple-Interpolation. - A final species of intratextualism demands that
two (or more) similarly phrased constitutional commands be read in
pari materia. What's sauce for one must be sauce for the other, and so
a principled interpreter must, for example, construe the Vesting
Clauses of Articles I, II, and III with equal generosity, or the four
voting rights amendments as coextensive in scope. Here we are deal-
ing not merely with a recurring word, or even a recurring word-cluster,
183 See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1143-73
(1995); see also JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME (forthcoming). I consider these works to
be among the most important current projects in constitutional theory.
184 See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205
(1979).
185 See WILLS, supra note 34.
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but with a complete, carefully elaborated command that appears in
identical language with a single variation that (presumptively) should
make no legal or moral difference: "The [fill in the blank] power shall
be vested . . ." and "The right of citizens of the United States ... to
vote.., shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of [fill in the blank]."
The key to this brand of intratextualism is interpolation: we read
the commands as if a metacommand clause existed telling us to con-
strue parallel commands in parallel fashion. Because such a meta-
command clause does not in fact exist, this form of interpolation must
remain open to the possibility that, upon reflection, there are sound
constitutional reasons not to treat the individual commands as in pari
materia. But unless such sound reasons are identified - explaining
why two blank-filling words are really different at heart - an inter-
preter would seem wholly unprincipled if he refused to read like com-
mands alike.
To oversimplify slightly: dictionary-like intratextualism tells us
what the Constitution "could mean; concordance-like intratextualism
tells us what it should mean; and rulebook-like intratextualism tells us
what it must mean.
C. Some Strengths of Intratextualism
Perhaps the greatest virtue of intratextualism is this: it takes seri-
ously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled grab bag of
assorted clauses. To modify Marshall, it is a (single, coherent) Consti-
tution we are expounding. 18 6 Granted, various strands of nontextual
argument often aspire to holism. Within the method of historical ar-
gument, for example, narrow clause-bound stories coexist with epic sa-
gas spanning the entire American constitutional experience, such as the
towering trilogy Bruce Ackerman is in the process of building. i8 7
Structuralists like Charles Black invite us to go beyond the clause in
search of larger institutional patterns of constitutional meaning. 88
Doctrinalists like Laurence Tribe organize individual cases and dis-
crete lines of cases into comprehensive theoretical models and frame-
works.18 9  But none of these efforts is particularly textual - none
seems to emphasize, as has Jed Rubenfeld in much of his fascinating
work,190 the Constitution's writtenness. In brief, clause-bound textu-
186 Because I consider the Constitution a single text, I have here designated clausal compari-
sons within the document as intratextual, as distinct from intertextual comparisons between
clauses in the Constitution on one hand and clauses in other documents on the other.
187 See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
INTERPRETATIONS (forthcoming).
188 See BLACK, supra note 22.
189 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
190 See sources cited supra note 183.
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alism tries to do justice to the Constitution's writtenness but not its
wholeness; various other forms of argument try to do justice to whole-
ness but not writtenness; whereas intratextualism tries to do justice to
both, and at the same time.
Emphasis on the Constitution's writtenness - its general textuality
and its specific textual provisions - has certain democratic virtues.
The Constitution is a compact document that most Americans can
read. With modest effort, even layfolk can become familiar with its
words and basic layout. As Marshall insists in McCulloch, one of the
greatest strengths of the Constitution is that its words can be "under-
stood by the public"'191 - "We the People" for whom and to whom it
speaks. The text of the document itself constitutes a democratic focal
point' 92 - an open meeting hall, a common language - that can
structure the conversation of ordinary Americans as they ponder the
most fundamental and sometimes divisive issues in our republic of
equal citizens. Certain forms of nontextual constitutional interpreta-
tion are often inherently exclusionary, requiring intimate familiarity
with vast amounts of case law and the subtle arts of doctrinal analysis,
or mastery of history writ large and writ small, or fluency in abstruse
political philosophy. Of course, a holistic textualism also calls for spe-
cial skill, seeing and showing how different clauses cohere into larger
patterns of constitutional meaning, and those more familiar with the
document itself will be advantaged. But new technology has made the
particular brand of textual holism I am highlighting here easily acces-
sible to layfolk. A simple constitutional concordance can show all citi-
zens where various words and phrases appear and recur in the docu-
ment; with this concordance in hand, even layfolk could begin to
ponder the possible patterns and implicit principles that intratextual-
ism highlights. 193 And such a concordance can easily be generated by
computers with word-search capacity.
94
The particular type of intratextualism that I am highlighting here
harmonizes nicely with other forms of holistic textualism. Even if ad-
joining clauses have no linguistic overlap, they often deal with related
subjects, and each is often illuminated by careful comparison with its
neighbors. This is the paragraphism technique that Marshall bungled
in considering the original and appellate jurisdiction clauses in
191 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 406 (1819).
192 Cf SCHELLING, supra note 177, at 57-80 (discussing focal points).
193 Even though intratextual analysis will often lead readers to consider certain clauses and
their possible interrelation, fully satisfying constitutional analysis will often require the use of
other tools of interpretation once the relevant clauses and questions have been identified. Given
that some of these techniques are less easily accessible to layfolk, the democratic advantages of
intratextualism may be real but nonetheless limited.
194 For those with access to the Internet, a concordance can be generated by visiting the web-
site run by the Library of Congress, at chttp://lcweb2.loc.gov/const/constquery.html>.
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Marbury, and that Story aced in Martin. For an even more celebrated
effort, consider the following passage from the case that (in retrospect,
at least) put the Court on the road to Roe:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association con-
tained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
"in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is an-
other facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment
in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of pri-
vacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people."
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.
195
Even those of us who, as a substantive matter, disagree with some of
what Justice Douglas writes here 196 should applaud his urge to try his
hand - if all too quickly - at holistic textualism. Writing fifteen
years later, Ely raised questions about Douglas's substantive result in
Griswold, but embraced - indeed extended - Douglas's methodology,
offering a textual "tour" not simply of the Bill of Rights but of the en-
tire Constitution. 197
195 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (citation omitted).
196 For example, I doubt that the Self-Incrimination Clause is as tightly linked to privacy as
Justice Douglas implies. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CoNsTITuTIoN AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRsT PRINCIPLES 65-66 (i997).
197 See ELY, supra note 134, at 88-101, 221 n.4. Another brand of holistic textualism squeezes
meaning from the Constitution's organization chart - by drawing inferences from the fact that
federal powers are conferred in Article I, Section 8, whereas restrictions on federal power appear
in Section 9, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (i819); by observing that all
the limits in Section 9, and the original Bill of Rights, were designed as limits on federal power,
with Section io as the home of limits on states, see Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet)
243, 248-49 (1833); and so on. Arguments in this tradition might point to the special place of tex-
tual honor held by the Constitution's first three words as evidence of popular sovereignty as the
document's first principle; or to the very existence of separate Articles I, II, and I as evidence of
the separation of powers and the coextensiveness of the three great federal departments; or to the
firstness of Article I as evidence of Congress's primacy; or to the location of the Veto Clause in
Article I as evidence that this presidential power is legislative in nature. By contrast, a Blackian
structuralist arguing for these four propositions would point to institutional patterns rather than
the organization of constitutional text. On this view, popular sovereignty is the Constitution's
first principle because the document became law only when ratified by special conventions of the
people. The equality of the departments is proved by the fact that none is wholly dependent on
the others for appointment and continuance in office, and their coextensiveness reflects the func-
tional reality that one department makes federal law, which the other departments then enforce
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When extended beyond paragraphism to encompass the entire
document, holistic textualism has an obvious virtue: it invites readers
to ponder connections between noncontiguous clauses that have no
textual overlap, yet nevertheless cross-illuminate. But truly holistic
textualism also has an obvious weakness: there are so many clauses to
consider and an almost infinite number of interclausal comparisons
that could be performed. Yet some interclausal comparisons are more
likely to be promising leads than others. 198 Where and how does one
start? Holistic textualism does not give us much guidance. Intratex-
tualism has equal and opposite virtues and vices. It tells us when
reading clause X to pay particular attention to similarly worded but
nonadjoining clauses Y and Z. This focus narrows the field of view,
but also gets us going and gives us direction. It leads the reader to
comparisons that are particularly likely to be rewarding, because
similar wording will quite often be a surface marker of a deeper ana-
lytic insight waiting to be found upon close inspection.
Douglas's paragraphistic tour and Ely's even more holistic tour are
similarly motivated: each interpreter seeks to persuade us that he is
not simply reading his personal preferences into the Constitution. Un-
like Lochner,'9 9 privacy has roots in many parts of the Bill of Rights,
Douglas insists; most of the Constitution is about process, Ely argues.
These examples suggest another virtue of intratextualism and other
forms of holistic textualism: their usefulness in constraining (or at least
highlighting) interpretive cheating. Intratextualism invites us to ask
how interpretation of clause X (affecting, say, judicial power) is to be
squared with interpretation of similarly worded clause Y (affecting,
say, executive power). For example, if the Supreme Court insists that
lower courts cannot defy its precedents because these courts are "infe-
rior" to it in Article III, why shouldn't the President likewise be able to
insist that special prosecutors and Independent Counsels cannot defy
his policies because these officers are supposed to be "inferior" officers
in Article II? (What's sauce for the goose .... ) We shall return to this
specific question later; for now it is enough to see that the intratextual
tool alerts us to possible self-dealing in judicial interpretation, as the
and adjudicate, respectively. If Congress stands first among equals, it is because legislation tem-
porally and functionally precedes execution and adjudication, or because the legislature is the
largest branch and its lower House stands closest to the citizenry. If the veto is a legislative
power, it is because functionally the President is involved in lawmaking, regardless of the textual
placement of the Veto Clause.
198 In addition, certain clauses may be especially rich with meaning and worthy of much more
attention than other clauses. In deploying intratextual analysis in this Article, I have chosen to
highlight various clauses that in my view are hugely important but understudied: the Preamble,
the Article I Speech or Debate Clause, the Article I Attainder and Nobility Clauses, the Thir-
teenth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities
Clauses.
I9 Lochner v. New York, I98 U.S. 45 (195o).
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Court pumps up clauses that it favors or that empower it while de-
flating clauses that it disfavors or that empower others.
Finally, intratextualism also has a certain undeniable aesthetic at-
traction, appealing to ideals of symmetry and harmony. When done
well, intratextualism is elegant. The use of linguistic links to trace
thematic threads is a common feature of aesthetically pleasing inter-
pretation of great works of literature, for example. However, the Con-
stitution is not and should not become a mere objet d'art. Thus the
aesthetic appeal of intratextualism could be reckoned a weakness as
well as a strength. And there are other weaknesses to consider.
D. Some Weaknesses of Intratextualism
Carried to extremes, intratextualism may lead to readings that are
too clever by half - cabalistic overreadings conjuring up patterns that
were not specifically intended and that are upon deep reflection not
truly sound but merely cute (if pro is the opposite of con, what is the
opposite of progress?) or mystical. (If certain clauses turned out to be
anagrams of other clauses, surely nothing important should turn on
this fact.) As is apparent when we consult ordinary dictionaries, the
same words sometimes sensibly mean different things in different con-
texts. As illustrated most vividly by Langdell, intratextualism can be-
come a mechanical exercise that blunts good judgment and leads to
outlandish outcomes. Given that sensible use of intratextualism will
require us to consider the limits of the technique, the technique will
not so much dictate results as suggest possible readings. Even when
the intratextual tool can generate interpretive leads and clues, we still
need other tools of interpretation to finally assess the plausiblity of any
reading suggested by intratextualism.
What's more, unless complemented by other tools of analysis, in-
tratextualism may be too self-referential, even autistic. It highlights
the document's intratextual links, but casts no light on its possibly il-
luminating intertextual links to other documents, such as the English
Bill of Rights, state constitutions, the Declaration of Independence,
and the Articles of Confederation. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing passage from McCulloch:
[T]here is no phrase in [the Constitution] which, like the articles of con-
federation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that
every thing granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the
ioth amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the exces-
sive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly," and
declares only that the powers "not delegated to the United States, nor pro-
hibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people;" thus [im-
pliedly permitting implied federal powers]. The men who drew and
adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting
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from the insertion of this word ["expressly"] in the articles of confedera-
tion, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments.2"'
Just as Marshall would argue later in the opinion that the phrase "ab-
solutely necessary" means something different from the simple word
"necessary," so here he is suggesting that the phrase "expressly dele-
gated" means something different from the simple word "delegated."
But Marshall is contrasting the actual wording of the Constitution not
merely with what it could have said (standard clause-bound textual-
ism) or with what another clause of the Constitution does say (classic
intratextualism). Rather, he is contrasting the text of the Constitution
with what its predecessor document said. The language of Article II of
the Articles of Confederation ("Each State retains ... every Power...
which is not ... expressly delegated to the United States . . . .") was an
obvious model for the language of the Tenth Amendment ("The pow-
ers not delegated to the United States ... are reserved to the States
.... "). The overall similarity of the phrasing201 makes all the more
remarkable the striking intertextual difference: the word "expressly" is
notably present in the earlier text and notably absent in the later text.
Another possible weakness of intratextualism is that it invites
strong inferences about constitutional meaning from the document's
grammar and syntax. For example, interpolation-style intratextualism
presumes that two clausal commands should receive identical treat-
ment because they feature the same basic grammar and syntax. But
even if two clauses were initially designed to work together, if their
underlying problems have evolved in different ways, something must
give. If we adapt each clause's doctrine to fit the new shape of prob-
lems, then the initial linkage between the two doctrines must give. If
we preserve the linkage of doctrine by arguing that what's sauce for
one is sauce for the other, maybe one sauce will taste bad (because one
underlying problem has changed in some way that the other has
not).
20 2
Note, however, that many of these criticisms of intratextualism as
an interpretive tool may prove too much - they also apply to other
traditional techniques of constitutional interpretation. If intratextual-
ism reads too much into patterns of word usage, perhaps standard
200 McCulloch v. Maryland, i7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4o6 (1819).
201 1 put aside here other important differences of phrasing marked by the ellipses.
202 For example, the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are in pari materia, with the first
addressing race and the second, sex. But the overall ratio of male voters to female voters is more
likely to approximate fifty-fifty than the ratio of white voters to black voters. And although sex is
conventionally understood as binary (male/female), the same is not true of race, given the emer-
gence of more than two socially recognized "races" in America. Also, suppose racially polarized
voting begins to emerge far more vividly than gender polarized voting. In such a world, perhaps
doctrinal rules for implementing the Fifteenth Amendment (in, say, apportionment cases) should




clause-bound textualism suffers from the same flaw. If intratextualism
does not merely constrain interpretation but also at times loosens it by
opening up interpretive possibilities, isn't the same true of other tools
of interpretation?20 3  If changed circumstances sometimes call for dis-
regarding an intratextual linkage that no longer makes sense, the same
may be true of ordinary clause-bound textualism. In the end, these
cautions remind us that no tool of interpretation is a magic bullet. But
each tool can be a lens through which to read, an imperfect but still
useful lens whose reading must be checked against readings generated
by other lenses. And the ultimate proof of any given tool must be
whether it in fact ever works: does the tool in real and hard cases ever
help us to reach satisfying and sound legal results?
2°4
203 Both Karl Llewellyn and Jack Balkin have observed that interpretive canons often come in
opposing semiotic pairs. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (195o);
J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Rea-
son, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211, 216-i8 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). Intratextualism can also be seen in this light. Paired against the notion
that the same words should mean the same thing (e.g., "shall be vested") is the idea that some-
times the same words should mean different things because the overall context of two clauses is
different (e.g., chameleon words). Paired against the notion that different words should mean dif-
ferent things (e.g., "necessary" versus "absolutely necessary" and "all cases" versus "controversies"
- what I have called the flip side of intratextualism) is the idea that sometimes different words
should mean the same thing, either because they are in effect synonyms (e.g., "necessary" and
"needful") or because a phrase is essentially an explanatory or declaratory gloss that only clarifies,
but does not change, meaning (e.g., the equal protection gloss on due process). The fact that for-
mally opposed pairs exist does not mean that anything goes or that interpretation is some sort of
sham or shell game. Reasons must be given for choosing one or the other of an opposing pair. If
we claim that same means same, we must be prepared to defend the underlying similarity of con-
text; whereas if we claim that a given word is a chameleon, we must identify and defend the con-
textual difference. To pick another example, if we claim that the Necessary and Proper Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause are essentially "declaratory" - adding emphasis but not new
rules - then we must be prepared to defend that claim with evidence beyond the conclusory la-
bel. See supra note ii and pp. 772-73 (offering historical evidence that supports a declaratory
reading of these two clauses).
204 Like textual argument more generally, intratextual argument is by no means an inherently
politically conservative interpretive tool. Today's foremost judicial champions of textualism (jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, for example) may be conservative, but in the Warren Court and Burger
Court eras, some of the greatest champions of textualism (Justice Black and Professor Ely, for ex-
ample) were leading liberals. All proper techniques of constitutional interpretation can be used by
both liberals and conservatives alike.
Note also that intratextualism can be used in statutory interpretation as well as in constitu-
tional law. Indeed, Professors Eskridge and Frickey have identified the following as a standard
maxim of modem statutory interpretation: "Interpret the same or similar terms in a statute the
same way." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, z993 Term-Fore-
word: Law as Equilibrium, io8 HARv. L. REV. 26 app. at 99 (1994). I shall not here attempt seri-
ous analysis of statutory intratextualism. Some of the arguments I have offered - focusing on the
Constitution as a compact, cleanly bounded, and easily accessible document, written for ordinary
people and designed to endure over centuries - may not readily transfer to the realm of statutory
interpretation. And in surveying canonical cases and commentaries, I have intentionally focused
on issues of constitutional as opposed to statutory interpretation.
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To answer this question, let us turn to three of the most difficult is-
sues of our time and see if intratextualism can generate useful interpre-
tive leads and clues, and thereby prove its worth in action.
I[I. CASES AGAIN
A. Morrison and Starr
The biggest constitutional story of 1998 took place mostly outside
the Supreme Court, with Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr chal-
lenging President Bill Clinton across a range of issues.205 Counsel
Starr undeniably wields prosecutorial powers - executive powers -
and yet no executive officer appointed him, no executive officer di-
rectly supervises him, no executive officer can countermand him across
the board, and no executive officer can remove him at will. How is
this possible? The short answer is that this is exactly what Congress
provided for by statute20 6 and what the Supreme Court upheld in its
1988 case, Morrison v. Olson.20 7  But the statute is unconstitutional
and the case is wrongly decided. And intratextualism can help us see
this more clearly.
Much of the debate in Morrison swirls around the Article II Vest-
ing Clause.208 If all federal executive power is vested in the President,
surely the Independent Counsel cannot wield federal executive power
and yet be immune from presidential control (via at-will removal or
some other countermand device). So argues Justice Scalia in his force-
ful but lonely dissent. 20 9 The Court majority suggests that Independ-
ent Counsels do not constitute an undue interference with presidential
power,210 but Justice Scalia points out that the Vesting Clause is writ-
ten in absolute language calling for rule-like enforcement rather than
mushy balancing: "The executive power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent."21' How, Scalia asks, are judges to say what is undue, and
where do they get the right to reword the Constitution? Shut up, the
Court explains. Scalia also points out that the major Court precedents
at hand - Myers2 12 and Humphrey's Executor2 13 - allow exceptions
to at-will removal only for quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial officers,
205 This is probably as good a place as any to acknowledge that Kenneth Starr is my friend. I
consider him a scholar and a gentleman, and none of my criticism of the statute and the case that
made his appointment possible should be construed as a criticism of him personally.
206 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (994).
207 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
208 U.S. CONST. art. III, § i, cl. i.
209 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705, 734 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, 693.
211 U.S. CONST. art. II, § x, cl. I (emphasis added). As we saw above at pages 76o-6I, Justice
Story made much the same point for the Court in Martin.
212 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
213 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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whereas prosecutors are purely executive creatures.2 14 We are willing
to rewrite these cases, replies the Court. We admit we cannot square
our holding today with what these cases say, but we can square it with
what these cases did on their facts.
2 
15
But Scalia's position on the Vesting Clause has some problems of
its own, even though the majority opinion fails to see them.21 6 Scalia
concedes that as long as the President retains the basic power to re-
move an executive officer at will, or otherwise countermand that offi-
cer's orders, the Vesting Clause command would be satisfied.21 7 But
on the facts of Morrison, the President has precisely this power of
countermand. If the President truly disagrees with the Independent
Counsel, the President can make the Counsel vanish with one stroke of
the presidential pardon pen: no underlying targets of prosecution, no
prosecutor. Poof! Anyone who today doubts this obvious presidential
power should talk to Caspar Weinberger (who received precisely such
a pardon) or Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh (who was effec-
tively poofed out of existence). As President Ford's pardon of Richard
Nixon should remind us, pardon may occur at any time after the crime
- before sentence, before conviction, before trial, and even before in-
dictment. 218  A truly skillful chief executive can wield this mighty
broadsword as a surgical scalpel by explaining the facts of life to an
Independent Counsel (publicly or privately): unless she does X and Y
and refrains from Z, the President will be obliged to pardon. Granted,
such threats and deeds may make the President look bad politically,
but so does the threat or deed of at-will removal - just ask Archibald
Cox or Robert Bork - and Scalia concedes that the power of at-will
removal suffices to satisfy the Vesting Clause.
This is what the Morrison majority should have said to Justice
Scalia, but did not. The Court's weak opinion feels like the work not
of the Chief Justice who signs it, but of a young law clerk with limited
214 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 723-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-93.
216 One possible line of attack on Scalia's position would invoke the Federal Reserve System:
under Scalia's logic, isn't the Federal Reserve unconstitutional because its head is not removable
at will? But Scalia (or some other believer in the general concept of the unitary executive) might
concede that the textual strictness of the Vesting Clause must be accommodated to two post-
Founding phenomena that the Framers could not have anticipated - the rise of the plebiscitarian
presidency and the discovery of Keynesian techniques allowing unscrupulous incumbent Presi-
dents to artificially inflate the economy in election years (with disastrous effects perhaps setting in
only after the election). But this concession hardly supports the Independent Counsel statute.
Prosecutorial self-dealing is not something that the Framers failed to anticipate. And the solution
they provided, based on publicity (via grand juries, the press, and legislative oversight) and im-
peachment (if necessary) still works and works well - better than the Independent Counsel stat-
ute, in fact. This, I suggest, is the lesson that emerges when we compare Watergate - where the
Framers' system worked beautifully - with Whitewater, where the flawed statute has not.
217 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 724 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 This practice is in keeping with the views propounded by Publius. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 74, at 448-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1g6i).
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constitutional vision.2 19 Here is where intratextualism comes in, for
one of its virtues is that it can help even novices see larger constitu-
tional patterns at work. The Article II Vesting Clause speaks of "the
executive Power" vested in the "President." Using a concordance ap-
proach to this clause, a clerk should have tried to consult the other
clauses - and there are remarkably few of them - that speak of the
"Power" of the "President." This would have begun to sharpen the
clerk's analysis of whether the Independent Counsel amounted to an
"undue" interference (whatever that means) with presidential power.
And when the clerk consulted the concordance-generated checklist of
clauses, he would have quickly come to the Article II, Section 2 menu
of presidential power that should be read alongside the (nonadjoining)
Vesting Clause. Right at the beginning of this menu the clerk would
have found the following words: "The President ... shall have Power
to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment. '220 Intratextualism would have en-
couraged the clerk to ponder these words and their possible analytic
connection to the Vesting Clause and the issues in the case at bar. Of
course, there is no guarantee that the clerk would upon reflection have
seen the obvious importance of the Pardon Clause for the issues in
Morrison. But at least the intratextual tool would have led him to wa-
ter, even if it could not have forced him to drink.
Had the Morrison Court pointed to the Pardon Clause as its best
response to Scalia, it would have been clear to all in 1998 that Counsel
Kenneth Starr is constitutionally a very different animal from Counsel
Alexia Morrison. When the President himself is a possible target - as
is the case in Starr's investigation and was not in Morrison's - he
cannot simply make the prosecution (and thus the prosecutor) go away
with a stroke of his presidential pardon pen, because he may not con-
stitutionally pardon himself.221  (To put the point in the Morrison
Court's own language, when the President is himself a target, an Inde-
pendent Counsel can indeed dramatically interfere with his role.)
We have yet to see the full power of intratextualism as it bears on
Morrison and Starr, however. The other major issue in Morrison con-
cerns not the removal (or countermanding) of the Independent Coun-
sel, but her initial appointment. The appointment question remains a
lively one a decade later, as evidenced by one of the standard sound-
bites of President Clinton's spinmeisters. Where, they ask, do suppos-
edly judicial officers like David Sentelle get the power to pick execu-
219 This candid comment might well be out of place in many contexts but seems appropriate to
offer here, in a discussion that so plainly implicates issues of interpretive style and constitutional
aesthetics.
220 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added).
221 See Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-
Pardons, Io6 YALE L.J. 779, 809 (996).
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tive branch prosecutors? The short answer is that the statute provides
that the Chief Justice may pick a special panel of judges who in turn
may pick Independent Counsels.2 22 But can this part of the statute be
squared with the Constitution? Yes, says the Morrison Court. No,
says the Constitution when read with the aid of intratextualism.
The Article II Appointments Clause provides that "the *Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments."223 Is an Independent Counsel an inferior offi-
cer within the meaning of the Constitution? The Morrison majority
proclaims that the line between "inferior" and "principal" officers "is
far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it
should be drawn."224  The Court then says that Alexia Morrison
"clearly falls on the 'inferior officer' side of that line.1225  To prove
this, the Court cobbles together an ad hoc test of "inferiority" with no
real explanation of where the prongs of the test came from or how they
fit with the Constitution's structure.226 In the first prong, for example,
the Court argues that Independent Counsels are inferior because they
can be removed from office, although not by the President directly,
and not at will. But as Justice Scalia notes in dissent, Independent
Counsels have more immunity from removal than even Cabinet mem-
bers, who serve at the President's pleasure. 227 Something has gone ter-
ribly wrong here. If removability is the test (or even a prong of the
test), then Cabinet members would be more "inferior" than Independ-
ent Counsels. Yet surely heads of departments are not "inferior"
within the meaning of the Constitution.
What, then, does "inferior" mean here? Just this: an Appointments
Clause "inferior" officer must be subordinate to a superior officer or
entity. When Congress chooses to allow unilateral appointment of an
"inferior" officer, without the special check and safeguard of Senate
confirmation, it must vest the power to appoint the "inferior" in his or
her superior. The superior appointing authority must have broad
power to direct or to countermand the decisions of the subordinate.
Thus, a court of law may be vested with power to appoint its law
clerks, magistrates, bailiffs, masters, and the like, but not prosecutors
or diplomats or colonels whom it does not (and cannot in the nature of
things) oversee and whose decisions it cannot overturn. The head of
the State Department may appoint an assistant within her department,
222 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 593(a) (1994).
223 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
224 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988).
225 Id.
226 See id. at 671-72.
227 See id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1999]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
but not an assistant within the Justice Department, or within the judi-
ciary.
Where, you might ask, did I come up with that? From ordinary
dictionaries and from the Constitution as its own dictionary. As Jus-
tice Scalia notes, ordinary dictionaries in both the 178os and today
confirm that "inferior" often means "subordinate. '228 An inferior offi-
cer is not merely a minor, or a petty, officer, but a subordinate to his
superior officer. A GS-3 clerk in the Justice Department might in
some sense be less than a GS-4 clerk in the Commerce Department,
but the former is not subordinate to the latter (even if a GS-3 is easy to
remove and a GS-4 is not. If Kenneth Starr is paid X, and Janet
Reno is paid 2X, Starr might in some sense be less than Reno but he
would not thereby become inferior to her. And this plain-meaning un-
derstanding of the word "inferior" receives a strong intratextual boost
from the Constitution itself, if we turn to it as a dictionary, as does
Justice Scalia:
At the only other point in the Constitution at which the word "inferior"
appears, it plainly connotes a relationship of subordination. Article I
vests the judicial power of the United States in "one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. Const., Art. III, § i (emphasis added). In Federalist No.
81, Hamilton pauses to describe the "inferior" courts authorized by Article
HI as inferior in the sense that they are "subordinate" to the Supreme
Court.
2 2 9
Justice Scalia's intratextual turn is elegant and incisive, but ever so
slightly incomplete. Had the Justice used a computer to generate an
intratextual concordance, he would have noted that the word "inferior"
also appears in Article I, Section 8 - and in a way that beautifully
drives home his point330 He quotes Article III, which speaks of a "su-
preme" Court and various "inferior" courts in a manner precisely
analogous to the Article II Appointments Clause, which speaks of
unilateral appointing authorities ("the President alone," "the Courts of
Law," and "the Heads of Departments") and various "inferior" officers.
Now, Article III does not in so many words say that inferior courts are
subordinate to the Supreme Court. But this is precisely what the Arti-
cle I clause that Scalia overlooks does say in so many words: "Congress
shall have Power ... to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court."'23 1 Thus, when Article III speaks of "inferior" courts, it like-
wise means "inferior to" their superior - the Supreme Court. Sym-
228 See id. at 719.
229 Id. at719-20.
230 In a later case, Justice Scalia explicitly calls attention to the intratextual link between the
"inferior" tribunals language of Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, and the cognate "inferior" courts
language of Article III, Section i. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 5oi U.S. 868, 902 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 9 (emphasis added).
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metrically, when the Article II Appointments Clause speaks of "infe-
rior" officers, it likewise means "inferior to" their superior - the rele-
vant unilateral appointing authority.
Here we see a possible constitutional pattern at work. But the in-
tratextual technique does not demand that we read the Constitution
this way - it merely suggests that such a reading might be the most
fitting and harmonious interpretation, the best way of reading the
document as a whole. Intratextualism helps us see clearly a possibly
attractive reading - it leads us to water. But should we drink?
Before we decide, let us revisit the Morrison Court's test of "inferi-
ority." The first factor that the Court stressed was that Independent
Counsels could be removed (although not at will and not by the Presi-
dent directly). We can now see how oblique and obtuse this factor is,
constitutionally. Cabinet members are removable at will, but they are
not constitutionally inferior, whereas lower federal judges have life
tenure, and yet their courts are constitutionally inferior.232 If we pon-
der these two data points, what concept of inferiority is at work in the
Constitution? Not removability, but subordination: an inferior officer
takes orders from his departmental superior. Inferior courts must fol-
low what the Supreme Court says,233 but no Justice Department offi-
cial can dictate to or countermand the Attorney General. (Of course,
Cabinet officers answer to the President, but they are the heads of
their respective departments.)
Let us now measure our intratextual reading of "inferiority" against
the readings generated by other lenses of analysis. If we examine the
text of the Appointments Clause in a standard clause-bound way, its
words seem an apt way of conferring on appointing authorities the
simple power to pick their own respective subordinates, without the
bother of Senate confirmation. And there is no alternative wording of
the clause that would have expressed this purpose more clearly with
the same compactness of language. (If you doubt this, tiy to draft an
alternative clause, as Marshall did in McCulloch when he argued that
it would have been quite easy to draft a grammatically restrictive Nec-
232 Note that if the judges on "inferior" courts were themselves deemed "inferior" officers - an
issue on which I take no position here - this would mean that Congress could choose to allow
lower federal judges to be appointed without Senate confirmation. At least one commentator has
lent his support to this view. See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges - Appointment, Supervision,
and Removal - Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 488-89, 499-
529 (193o). But see Weiss v. United States, 5IO U.S. 163, 191 n.7 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)
(noting the long-standing tradition of judges of inferior courts as principal officers); Amar, Two
Tiers, supra note 61, at 235 n.103 (1985) (noting Shartel's argument without endorsing it). Note
further that on my proposed reading of the Appointments Clause, if "inferior court" judges are
indeed "inferior" officers, their unilateral appointments could be vested in certain courts of law
but not in the President or in the head of an executive department, as these latter officers would
not be the relevant constitutional superior officer or entity of "inferior" judges.
233 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 828-37 (i994).
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essary and Proper Clause.) When we consult history, our proposed
reading perfectly fits the drafting records of the Appointments Clause
and its early implementation. The language permitting unilateral ap-
pointment of inferior officers emerged on the last day of the Philadel-
phia Convention, and with little debate - facts suggesting that it was
viewed as a minor housekeeping measure.2 34 Allowing major officers
to pick their own assistants keeps faith with this housekeeping read-
ing. But authorizing judges to appoint prosecutors - or diplomats or
colonels, for that matter - seems a far bigger deal. Had the delegates
understood that the clause could be so applied, we would expect to
find considerably more discussion. In keeping with the housekeeping
reading, the First Congress in one of its earliest statutes vested the
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs with the power to ap-
point and supervise his own assistant: "[T]here shall be in the said de-
partment, an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said principal offi-
cer, and to be employed therein as he shall deem proper .... 2 35  Soon
thereafter, Congress used similar language in allowing the Secretary of
War to appoint and monitor his own assistant.2 36 The Morrison Court
mentions almost none of this. The majority does quote a snippet from
Joseph Story's landmark constitutional treatise237 but misses the im-
port of the following passage, which it fails to quote:
The courts of the Union possess the narrow prerogative of appointing
their own clerk, and reporter .... The heads of department are, in like
manner, generally entitled to the appointment of the clerks in their respec-
tive offices.... [And] the postmaster general ... is invested with the sole
and exclusive authority to appoint, and remove all deputy post-masters
238
Six years after the publication of Story's 1833 treatise, the Supreme
Court expounded the Appointments Clause as follows in Ex parte
Hennen:
The appointing power here designated ... was no doubt intended to be
exercised by the department of the government to which the officer to be
appointed most appropriately belonged. The appointment of clerks of
Courts properly belongs to the Courts of law; and that a clerk is one of the
234 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 76, at 627-28. The only other recorded discussion of inferior
officers occurred a week earlier and strongly supports the idea that the Framers simply meant to
authorize the unilateral appointment of inferior officers by their respective superiors as a house-
keeping matter to spare the Senate's time. See id. at 537-39. In response to George Mason's con-
cern that the Senate would need to be in continuous session to approve all appointments, however
trivial, see id. at 537, Rufus King stated that he "did not suppose it was meant that all the minute
officers were to be appointed by the Senate, or any other original source, but by the higher officers
of the departments to which they belong." Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
235 Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 2, I Stat. 28, 29.
236 See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 49, 50.
237 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988).
238 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 153o, at 387 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (emphasis added).
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inferior officers contemplated by this provision in the Constitution cannot
be questioned. Congress, in the exercise of the power here given, by the
act of the 24 th of September, 1789, establishing the judicial Courts of the
United States...., declare that the Supreme Court, and the District Courts
shall have power to appoint clerks of their respective Courts; and that the
clerk for each District Court shall be clerk also of the Circuit Court in
such district.
2 3 9
When we turn from text and history to structural and practical ar-
guments, our intratextual reading gains steam. Judges should never be
in the business of picking prosecutors - this blurring of adjudicatory
and prosecutorial roles ill fits the general liberty-enhancing architec-
ture of separation of powers. Federal judges are given life tenure to
remove them from daily politics, but the Independent Counsel statute
risks politicizing the judiciary. (Consider all the partisan bickering
spawned by the lunch between Judge Sentelle and Senators Faircloth
and Helms.) Judges will not be good at picking prosecutors because
they have inadequate information and weak incentives. Whereas the
Attorney General has a wealth of information about the track record
of prosecutors, judges do not and should not have access to this trea-
sure trove of intra-executive intelligence, implicating various out-of-
court activities that lie beyond the proper province of judicial supervi-
sion. And when an appointing authority is picking its own assistant, it
obviously has strong incentives to pick well. If the subordinate does a
bad job, other government officials and ordinary citizens will and
should blame the boss. (This is why it is wholly proper to blame the
Chief Justice for so shoddy an opinion in Morrison, even if it were
clear that the opinion was written by a clerk whom the Chief simply
picked and supervised.) But when Independent Counsels mess up,
whom can we blame? Who is accountable? 240 (Textually, to whom is
239 Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (i Pet.) 230, 257-58 (839) (emphasis added); see also United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 5o8, 5io-iI (1878) (describing inferior officers as "inferior to" their
respective appointing authorities and as "mere aids and subordinates of the heads of the depart-
ments"); Collins v. United States, r878 Ct. Cl. 568, 574 (1879) ("The word inferior ... means sub-
ordinate or inferior to those officers in whom respectively the power of appointment may be
vested - the President, the courts of law, and the heads of departments." (emphasis added)).
240 Accountability was an overriding concern of the Framers in the appointments context. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamil-
ton explained:
Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made [in New York by a gover-
nor acting behind closed doors with his council].... When inquiry has been made, the
blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part,
have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to de-
termine by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified
and so manifestly improper.
Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The sole and undivided
[appointment] responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more
exact regard to reputation."); THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The blame
of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and absolutely."). The Framers' com-
mitment to public accountability is mocked by a statute that gives a group of low-visibility judges
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Counsel Starr inferior? How can there be an inferior without a supe-
rior?241)
Doctrinal arguments give us additional reasons to think that the in-
tratextual pattern we have identified is not merely clever but sound.
The subordination principle and the 1839 Hennen case lay down a
nice and easy bright-line test.242 Instead of following this clean princi-
ple and this clear case, the Morrison Court slaps together a multi-
factor test that has no square basis in precedent and that the Court
admits might not sensibly bind a later Court. Indeed, less than a dec-
ade after Morrison, in an opinion for eight Justices authored by none
other than Justice Scalia, the Court apparently abandoned Morrison's
ad hoc test. According to the Court:
Morrison did not purport to set forth a definitive test for whether an of-
fice[r] is "inferior" under the Appointments Clause.
Generally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relationship
with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: whether
one is an "inferior" officer depends on whether he has a superior. It is not
enough that other officers may be identified who formally maintain a
higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that
were the intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase "lesser of-
ficer." Rather, in the context of a clause designed to preserve political ac-
countability relative to important government assignments, we think it
evident that "inferior officers" are officers whose work is directed and su-
pervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.
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power to make important nonjudicial appointments behind closed doors, with no record of who
said what to whom. Morrison ignored the key concept of accountability, but the Court has of late
rediscovered this concept and restored it to its central place in proper Appointments Clause
thinking. See Edmond v. United States, 1i7 S. Ct. 1573, 1579-8I (I997).
241 Surely it would be odd to claim that Starr is "inferior" to his "superior" Reno, for Reno lacks
broad power to tell Starr what to do. That of course is the whole point of a statute designed to
make him independent of her. But precisely to the extent he is truly independent, he is not truly
inferior. A truly inferior independent calls to mind a truly square circle.
242 In i88o, the Court in Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (188o), moved away from some of the
language of Hennen. But as Justice Scalia notes, the facts of Siebold seem consistent with the
clean bright-line subordination principle: the Court allowed judges to appoint special election su-
pervisors whose duties were somewhat akin to marshals and ministerial clerks, and who pre-
sumably answered to the appointing court. Siebold treated the Appointments clause only in
passing and laid down no general doctrinal test. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 721-22 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). In any event, whatever Siebold said or did, the modem Court has now clearly identified
inferiority with subordination, see Edmond v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 573, I58O-8i (i997).
243 Edmond, 117 S. Ct. at 158o-8r. For scholarly recognition that Edmond in effect abandoned
Morrison, see Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New Ap-
pointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1117-20 (1998). Note that in requir-
ing that a unilaterally appointed inferior officer be appointed by his own superior, I go a step be-
yond Edmond. (Even if the general in charge of American troops in Bosnia answers to other
generals, surely Congress may not vest his appointment in courts of law.) Note also that where
the President herself directly appoints an inferior officer - say, the White House Chief of Staff -
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In short, Morrison gives us a doctrinal test good for one day only -
precisely what sensitive doctrinalists and believers in neutral principles
abhor. To make matters even worse, the Morrison test, if actually ap-
plied, is extraordinarily manipulable, featuring multiple factors with
considerable wiggle room within each factor.
This leads to my final point. The overall judicial doctrine of infe-
riority seems remarkably self-serving. Over the last decade, the Court
has repeatedly insisted that "inferior" courts must follow its orders,
244
but it refuses to insist that "inferior" executive officers must similarly
follow the orders of executive branch superiors. Perhaps there are
good reasons for this inconsistency - but the Morrison Court never
gives them. Intratextualism does not, I repeat, imperiously demand
similar treatment here, but it does demand that the Court note the dif-
ferent treatment and justify it.245 The Morrison majority does neither:
it never discusses "inferior" courts under Articles I and IlI and the
light they might cast on "inferior" officers under Article IE. And let us
not overlook the fact that Morrison's bottom line aggrandizes the judi-
cial role in two more ways - by allowing judges to pick prosecutors
and by allowing the Chief Justice (the nominal author of Morrison) to
pick the judges who pick the prosecutors.
In the end, an intratextual analysis generates some remarkably
promising leads and clues in thinking about both presidential power
and the constitutional meaning of inferiority. I do not claim to have
definitively resolved the complex issues raised by Independent Coun-
sels in this short space. But I do claim to have put forth an analysis,
powerfully informed by intratextualism, that highlights just how much
is missed by the Morrison majority. Perhaps in the end, strong coun-
terarguments might be raised, but readers will be hard-pressed to find
any strong counterarguments in Morrison itself. Perhaps the rise of
the modern imperial and plebiscitary presidency calls for new institu-
tional checks unknown to the Founders. 246 However, Morrison - like
the inferior need not be supervised by a Senate confirmee, but indeed may be directly supervised
by the President herself, who could then be held more directly accountable for her direct assistant.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. Rav. 647, 666-68 & n.9o
(1996).
244 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, II7 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997); American Trucking Ass'ns Inc. v.
Smith, 496 U.S. z67, iSo (iggo); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 484 (1989). On the significance of the word "inferior" for the issues raised here, see
Caminker, cited above in note 233, at 828-38.
245 For example, even if inferiority means subordination within one's proper branch, executive
or judicial, the mode by which branch superiors supervise and command branch inferiors may
sensibly differ, given the different traditions and functions of the branches. Executive supervision
of inferiors may more often be informal and face to face than, say, the judicial supervision exer-
cised by the Supreme Court over inferior courts. Executive superiors may also enjoy control over
inferiors' salaries in ways that would be inappropriate within the judicial branch hierarchy. And
so on.
246 But see supra note 216 (suggesting that the Founders' model of impeachment, legislative
oversight, and press publicity remains more functional and attractive than the statutory innova-
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several of the Court's recent opinions on separation of powers2 47 - fo-
cuses more on ancient constitutional text than on modern institutional
structure. But the Court's textualism is embarrassing and blinkered
- clause-bound and anything but holistic. If the Court is to place so
much emphasis on text, it owes us a more sophisticated version of tex-
tualism.
B. Free Speech
It might be thought that the intratextual technique would be far
more valuable in mapping out issues of structure than of rights -
more constitutional clauses deal with the former, and there is thus
more text to work with on the structural side. But consider the bright
light that an intratextual approach could shed on many murky areas of
current free speech doctrine.
In the most celebrated speech case ever decided, the Supreme
Court famously proclaims that the First Amendment must be read
"against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials. '248 Elsewhere, New Ybrk Times v. Sullivan emphasizes the need
"for free political discussion to the end that government may be re-
sponsive to the will of the people,"249 notes that the case at hand im-
plicates "expression critical of the official conduct of public officials" 250
concerning "one of the major public issues of our time,"'25l and pro-
claims that suppression of antigovernment speech by the infamous Se-
dition Act of 1798 violated "the central meaning of the First Amend-
ment."2- 2 The grand themes of this grand opinion resonate with the
First Amendment approach of Alexander Meiklejohn, 25 3 emphasizing
the centrality of political speech, the intimate connection between free
speech and democratic self-government, and the special need to protect
political criticism of incumbent officialdom.
Today's Court, however, is drifting off course, away from the
Meiklejohnian polestar. In a recent case involving liquor ads, for ex-
ample, several Justices appear eager to shrink the doctrinal difference
tion at the heart of the present Independent Counsel statute, which injects judges into the highly
political process of picking prosecutors)
247 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2103-o5 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983).
248 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
249 Id. at 268.
250 Id. at 269.
251 Id. at 271.
252 Id. at 273.
253 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE (i96o) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM].
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between the protections accorded to political debate on the one hand
and mere commercial advertising on the other.254 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Thomas goes even further: "[There is no] philosophical
or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower
value' than 'noncommercial' speech. Indeed, some historical materials
suggest to the contrary. 255  The move here is subtle but profound.
The Justices are beginning to detach the First Amendment from de-
mocracy and to graft it onto property, moving from free speech to free
markets. A similar trend is at work in cases involving cable television
and campaign finance, 256 with the Free Speech and Press Clause be-
ginning to resemble the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (property)
more than the Article IV Republican Government Clause (equality and
democracy). If free speech is not, at its core, about democracy - and
therefore equality - then there is simply no constitutional problem
when Ross Perot, Steve Forbes, and Bill Gates get to talk more than
the rest of us put together if they own more than the rest of us put to-
gether. The First Amendment would prevent government from cen-
soring those who can pay for their speech, but would inspire no obliga-
tion to provide public fora at government expense, where poor folks
would have a turn at the mike. On this view - which reflects the in-
stincts of at least a sizeable minority of the current Court, and some-
times a majority - free speech is not, well, firee. So what exactly does
the First Amendment prohibit, according to the emerging paradigm?
Not merely laws that discriminate against speakers on the basis of
their political viewpoint, as did the Sedition Act, but all laws that treat
speakers differently on the basis of their content. The current Court's
general drift is constitutionally troubling, and intratextualism can help
us see why.
Begin with Justice Thomas's claim in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island57 that there is no "philosophical or historical basis" for treating
commercial speech as less constitutionally worthy than political
speech.258 Wrong. There is an obvious philosophical and historical
basis - in the philosophy and history of the Constitution itself, a phi-
losophy and history encoded in the words of the document. Justice
Thomas obviously cares about the document and the words in it, as is
evident from many of his thoughtful and disciplined opinions. 25 9 But
in Liquormart he fails to read these words for all they are worth.
254 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
255 Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring).
256 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. CL 1174 (1997); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
i (1976).
257 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
258 Id. at 522.
259 Perhaps my favorite is Justice Thomas's outstanding concurrence in White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 358-66 (1992) (offering a sensible and textually acute analysis of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause). For my oNn efforts to buttress Justice Thomas's textual argument with an
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Consider how a typical clause-bound reader might view the words
of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." These words make no distinc-
tion between different types of "speech." And in ordinary language,
"speech" typically includes more than political discourse. If we consult
ordinary dictionaries, commercial speech and political speech are both
subspecies of the same genus "speech," and neither seems linguistically
privileged as more central or paradigmatic than the other. Granted,
the grammatical absolutism of the First Amendment ("Congress shall
make no law") is a textual embarrassment, and we cannot take it seri-
ously, as all sophisticated lawyers know - "fire" in a crowded theater
and all that. But whatever nonabsolute doctrinal structure judges
fashion to translate the First Amendment into practice, this structure
need not discriminate between different types of speech, which are all
equally worthy, textually speaking. So might say a clause-bound
reader. However, the words when read in clause-bound isolation do
not tell the full story. We must also read them intratextually.
Begin with the phrase "Congress shall make no law." To the so-
phisticated clause-bound textualist, these words seem embarrassing in
their naive absolutism. Thus, they must be quickly thrust aside, for
surely no meaning can be squeezed from such an unpromising phrase.
But the intratextualist is not afraid of or embarrassed by these words.
She has seen them before. With her computer-generated concordance
in hand, the intratextualist ponders the possible link between the
opening words of the First Amendment and the words of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause: "Congress shall have Power ... To make all
Laws .... ." Is the linguistic link here - "Congress," "shall," "make,"
and "law" in the same order in two places - a clue or a dead end?
When we consult the history of the First Amendment with clue in
hand, we find that in the debates leading up to the Constitution's rati-
fication, Federalists uniformly claimed that Congress lacked enumer-
ated power to suppress free speech in the states.2 60 Nervous Anti-
Federalists were skeptical: suppose Congress tried to use the Necessary
and Proper Clause? The First Amendment was drafted to reassure all
concerned that Congress lacked enumerated power to restrict speech
and press (or to regulate religion, for that matter) in the states, not-
withstanding the Necessary and Proper Clause.261 Thus the textual
interlock between the First Amendment and the Necessary and Proper
Clause was no coincidence but part of a deep design.2 62
intratextual analysis, see Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to
Professor Friedman, 86 GEo. L.J. 1045 (1998).
260 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, sup'a note 95, at 36.
261 See id. at 35-41.
262 The precise placement of the "First" Amendment (it was originally third, but amendments
one and two went unratified in the i-79o's) provides further evidence of the interlock. See id.
(providing details). On organization-chart textualism more generally, see above note 197.
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But note what this means. If everyone thought that Congress sim-
ply lacked all enumerated power to restrict "speech" in the states, the
"speech" they all had in mind must obviously have been political dis-
course as opposed to mere commercial advertising. For no one denied
that Congress did indeed have broad power to regulate commercial
things for purely commercial purposes (so long as the commerce in-
volved goods or services crossing state lines). Using the Constitution
as a dictionary, we are quickly led to the idea that "speech" means
something more precise than what ordinary dictionaries might suggest.
Intratextualism can offer still more precision, as we proceed to
ponder what "speech" in the First Amendment might or might not
mean at its core. Here, too, the intratextualist has seen the word be-
fore. With concordance in hand, she points to Article I, Section 6 pro-
tecting congressional "Speech or Debate." Is this, too, a clue? Might
there be an analytic link here that can clarify constitutional thought?
Indeed yes. When we turn to other important historical antecedents of
the Constitution - reading intertextually to supplement our intratex-
tual analysis - we find that the phrase "freedom of speech" first ap-
pears in the landmark English Bill of Right of 1689: "the Freedom of
Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament."
263
And here are the words of the Articles of Confederation: "Freedom of
speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in
any court, or place out of Congress."264 Political speech is the core
idea here. Parliament - from the French parler, to speak - is a
speaking spot. But it is the home of a particular kind of speech: politi-
cal discourse. A Parliament is a place for a parley - a political con-
ference. So too with Congress. If a Senator takes the floor to adver-
tise the low beer prices at his liquormart, such "speech" might be
protected by a broad reading of Article I, Section 6 - but surely we
would say that it was at the outer periphery of protection, as "speech"
of distinctly lower value, constitutionally.
On this intratextual and intertextual view, the "freedom of speech"
in the First Amendment is likewise about political discourse at its core.
It is a reminder that in America, the people, not Congress, are sover-
eign. Our highest Parliament - our most exalted parley place - is
not confined by Capitol walls. Under the Speech and Debate Clause,
our servants in Congress may criticize their political adversaries free
from outside censorship; symmetrically, under the other Speech Clause
(the First Amendment), their adversaries may criticize incumbents free
from inside censorship. This, of course, is the deep insight of the great
case of New York Times v. Sullivan.
263 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the
Crown (Bill of Rights), z689, X W. & M., ch.2, § 9.
264 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. V, cl.5.
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I can only briefly sketch a few of the implications of this way of
thinking about constitutional "speech," with political discourse akin to
legislative "speech and debate" as the central paradigm, and with pub-
lic-minded speech outside the Capitol entitled to respect as part of the
proceedings of America's High Parliament, its sovereign citizenry. A
well governed parliament must never discriminate on the basis of po-
litical viewpoint. If A is free to take the floor to support the war, B
must be free to take the floor to oppose it. Speech may be limited: five
minutes per person. But the freedom of speech - understood here as a
protection against viewpoint discrimination in the regulation of politi-
cal discourse - is an absolute.2 65 And so the absolutist words of the
First Amendment are not nearly so embarrassing after all, despite
what sophisticated lawyers have been taught - hypotheticals about
fires and theaters have almost nothing to do with "the freedom of
speech" as the Constitution uses this term. Note, however, that con-
tent-based distinctions - reserving Tuesday for a campaign-finance
debate and Wednesday for a discussion of nuclear proliferation - are
often perfectly appropriate and quite different from viewpoint-based
discriminations. Our parliamentary model of freedom of speech
should also make clear that a working democracy requires not merely
negative prohibitions against government censorship, but also affirma-
tive government action to promote free speech - to create the assem-
bly room or town hall or public forum or other parley place where the
freedom of speech can truly take place. (So the First Amendment
words make perfect sense: Congress may not abridge, but it may and
indeed must promote the freedom of speech, if such freedom is to be
made real.) Finally, we must consider the proper distributional rules
at work in a proper parley place. Speech rights should not simply
track property or wealth distributions - even if some Senators are
rich and others poor, every Senator is entitled to be part of the great
debate. Speech is not merely property; it is democracy, too.
If this First Amendment paradigm looks suspiciously familiar, it
should. It closely resembles the model put forth by the great Alexan-
der Meiklejohn. This fact should reassure us that, regardless of in-
tratextual and intertextual pyrotechnics, there are many other thought-
ful things to be said for this way of thinking about the First
Amendment. 266 Moreover, my claim here is not that intratextualism
265 For important elaboration of my qualifying phrase "regulation of political discourse," see
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
('995).
266 Meiklejohn himself also observes, and draws support from, the intratextual linkage between
the two constitutional speech clauses. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 253,
at 34-36; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
256 [hereinafter Meiklejohn, The First Amendment]. Elsewhere in his work, Meiklejohn features
other important and elegant intratextual arguments. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM, supra note 253, at 53 (noting the intratextual linkage between the "abridge" wording
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ineluctably leads to Meiklejohn. (Recall that intratextual arguments
can often be used on many sides of a debate.) Rather, my more modest
claim is that one remarkably straightforward and illuminating use of
intratextualism leads us rather quickly towards the Meiklejohnian oa-
sis.
A few quick qualifications are in order before we leave this oasis.
The words of the First Amendment are not precisely in pari materia
with those of Article I, Section 6, and I do not claim that every rule
that makes sense in one place will make sense in the other. There are
obvious practical differences of context between formal legislative as-
semblies on the one hand, and conversations among the people out of
doors on the other.2 67 Intratextualism demands only that in thinking
about the one clause, we should think about the other as well and jus-
tify differential treatment if upon reflection such treatment makes
sense (as it sometimes will). Nor do I say that commercial speech
should be cast out of the First Amendment. For example, it may be
difficult for judges to draw lines that cleanly distinguish the political
from the commercial in mixed cases. This doctrinal difficulty may ar-
gue for a two-tiered (or sliding scale) approach in which nonpolitical
speech still gets some lesser protection, with less pressure put on the
line-drawing than in an all-or-nothing approach. Nor do I say that
campaign finance laws are utterly unproblematic, for we must always
be wary of the ways that incumbents will try to draft rules that handi-
cap their challengers. Nor do I say that content-based discriminations
should escape scrutiny. Sometimes, a content-based rule will have an
obvious viewpoint-based purpose and effect. (Imagine a 1969 rule that
no one may use the word "babykilling" or a 1999 rule that no one may
use the phrase "butchers of Beijing.') I do say, however, that content-
based discriminations are not themselves (even presumptive) violations
of the freedom of speech. Indeed, the entire edifice of First Amend-
ment doctrine - full of distinctions like the one between obscene and
nonobscene speech, or between political and commercial speech, for
that matter - is itself content-based. For judges to say that judges
may use certain content lines but no one else may use similar lines
seems obtuse and self-dealing.
268
My final qualification is the most important. Thus far, I have said
nothing about the Fourteenth Amendment, which makes First
Amendment speech and press rights applicable against states. As I
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Meiklehohn, The First Amendment, supra, at 253-54
(noting the popular-sovereignty linkage between the Preamble; Article I, Section 2; and the First
and Tenth Amendments, all of which use the words "the people").
267 For a nice discussion, see Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expres-
sion and the Subordination of Groups, i9go U. ILL. L. REv. 95.
268 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-31 (i993) (invali-




have explained elsewhere, the Fourteenth Amendment's second sen-
tence features no less than five intratextual cross-references. 269 There
is much meaning to be squeezed from these clues, as I have tried to
show. But now is not the time, and this is not the place, for a detailed
intratextual tour of the Fourteenth Amendment. 270 For now, it suffices
to say that nothing in the letter or spirit of that Amendment undercuts
the view of free speech I have presented here. The abolitionist men
and women who risked their lives against the Slave Power - who
fought and bled and sometimes died for freedom of speech - had po-
litical and religious and literary speech at heart and in mind, not the
right to push cut-rate beer.
27 1
C. Boerne
There is still one more hard nut to crack. Having seen intratextu-
alism at work on a structural issue and on a rights issue, let us now
consider a case that implicates both rights and structure. In City of
Boerne v. Flores,272 federalism, separation of powers, and rights intri-
cately intertwine, making the case one of the most interesting of the
last decade. As a matter of federalism, does Congress enjoy broad
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose sub-
stantive obligations on states beyond those that the Supreme Court has
identified in interpreting Section x? As a matter of separation of pow-
ers, who within the federal government should have the last word on
the meaning of Section i? May Congress "overrule" a Supreme Court
interpretation of Section i if Congress has a more expansive concep-
tion of a given right? As a matter of rights, what does the free exercise
of religion (protected against Congress in the First Amendment and
against states in the Fourteenth) mean? Simply that government may
not intentionally target religion for disfavored treatment? Or, more
broadly, that religious practice should sometimes trump a secular law
that in practice happens to interfere with it?
On the question of religious free exercise, we must begin by back-
tracking to 1990. In that year, the Court held in Employment Division
v. Smith273 that the First Amendment barred only laws designed to
269 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 163-74, 191.
270 Cf. id. (providing such a tour).
271 As should be clear from my reference to literary and religious speech, my target today is not
a reading of the First Amendment that stresses autonomy as a value, but Justice Thomas's view
that commercial speech deserves full equality of status with political discourse. On important
differences between autonomy and commerce in the First Amendment, see C. EDWIN BAKER,
HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989).
272 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
273 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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penalize religious practice as such. 274 Congress thought this approach
too narrow and criticized Smith by name in its 1993 Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA).275  RFRA provided that whenever a
state or federal law imposes a substantial burden on religious practice,
the law should not apply unless a "compelling governmental interest"
is at stake. 276 In effect, RFRA tried to codify the views of the dissent-
ers in Smith. But in Boerne, the Court reaffirms Smith and strikes
down RFRA as beyond the scope of proper congressional power.277
Justice O'Connor was one of the Smith dissenters2 78 and in
Boerne, she writes another dissent arguing that she has been right all
along: the First Amendment was drafted to protect religion from the
incidental impact of even neutral, secular laws.2 7 9 To the clause-bound
reader, the argument might seem easy. The Amendment speaks not
merely of laws designed to prohibit free exercise but laws that in fact
do prohibit it, regardless of legislative purpose. But this cannot be
right if we take the words of the Amendment seriously and read them
intratextually. As we have seen, the words of the Amendment were
designed to interlock with those of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and thus affirm that Congress simply lacked enumerated power to re-
strict speech or free exercise in the states.280 But if this is so, the
Framers obviously had in mind laws targeted against religion - these
laws were indeed not necessary and proper, and Congress had no
enumerated power to regulate religion qua religion. Congress, how-
ever, did enjoy enumerated power to pass general secular laws, and
these laws, even if they intruded on religious practice, were not ad-
dressed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment's first ad-
dressee - its first word - is Congress, and its initial directive is to
that body to "make no law." A Congress attempting to regulate reli-
gion as such - either openly or furtively - is obviously aware of
what it is doing, and the First Amendment speaks to it and says no:
"Congress, Make No Law!" But a Congress passing a sincerely secular
law pursuant to its legitimate enumerated powers might not even be
aware that the law might adversely affect some religious group some-
where of whose practices it is ignorant, or of whose existence it is
274 See id. at 878 (rejecting the argument that "religious motivation for using peyote place[d]
[respondents] beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious
practice").
275 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb-2ooobb-4 (1994)).
276 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2ooobb(b), 2ooobb-i (1994)).
277 See id. at 2171-72.
278 Technically, the Justice concurred in Smith's judgment, but on the general constitutional
issue of free exercise, she sided with the dissenters: like them and unlike the Smith majority, she
argued that free exercise principles require religiously based exemptions from secular statutes.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
279 See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2178-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
280 See supra pp. 814-I5.
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wholly unaware. (Indeed, the group or the religious practice may not
yet exist.) And so there is an obvious difference, under the Necessary
and Proper Clause and the interlocking First Amendment, between a
law banning a despised religion by name (or through some clever
sham), and a law banning the importation of an item that some relig-
ious group (unbeknownst to Congress) deems important to its religious
life.
To see this intratextually inspired point from a more conventionally
clause-bound perspective, consider the absolutism of the phrase "shall
make no law." If the Amendment merely prohibits laws targeting re-
ligion qua religion for disfavored treatment, these absolutist words
make perfect sense. But if the Amendment prohibits even secular laws
that happen to intrude on the "free exercise" of some group or other,
these absolutist words make no sense. Surely some religious practices
- even if sincere - cannot trump a proper secular law. (Imagine a
group that sincerely believes in sacrificing nonbelievers attempting to
vote in federal elections.) Justice O'Connor invokes the idea that re-
ligious duties to God are superior to and come before all else, 2 11 but if
so, religion (if sincere) must always prevail. In practice, of course,
O'Connor does not believe this; she is willing to balance.28 2 But once
religion is judged by a secular standard - even a strict one that uses
words like "compelling" - it is no longer logically superior and prior
to civic duties. In any event, the words of the Amendment do not con-
template balancing. They are absolute precisely because they are also
narrow.
But justice O'Connor may be right after all, albeit for reasons dif-
ferent from the ones she puts forth. Smith and Boerne pivot on the
Fourteenth Amendment not the First. Perhaps justice O'Connor is
looking for the right right, but in the wrong place. Indeed, there is
something odd about an opinion that talks so much about the Found-
ing in a case, like Boerne,28 -1 that is so obviously about the meaning of
Reconstruction. If she is to persuade, Justice O'Connor must turn
from men like James Madison and Thomas Jefferson to ponder men
like John Bingham and Charles Sumner and women like Harriet
Beecher Stowe. What's more, in parsing the words of the Fourteenth
Amendment, she should consider their intratextual links to the First.
The key words of the Fourteenth Amendment are simple: "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens." In the minds of those who wrote and ratified
281 See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ('[The] duty [owed the Creator] is
precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society .... "
(quoting JAMES MADISON, 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 184-85 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 19oi))
(second alteration in original)).
282 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
283 See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2 I81-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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these words, First Amendment rights and freedoms - religious exer-
cise, speech, press, petition, and assembly - stood as paradigmatic
"privileges" and "immunities" that henceforth no state could
abridge.2 8 Given this intent, expressed over and over in the relevant
debates, it is unsurprising that the key sentence borrows so many
words from the First Amendment itself - "shall," "make," "law," and
"abridge."
However, careful intratextual analysis highlights linguistic differ-
ences as well as similarities, and some of these differences suggest that
the Reconstructors may have had a more expansive vision of free exer-
cise in mind than did the Founders. Begin by noting that the Four-
teenth Amendment applies not only to the legislature, but to all
branches of the state government - and focuses not only on the mo-
ment of lawmaking (when the religious practice may not even exist),
but on the moment of law "enforce[ment,]" when the state-church con-
flict is clear to all. Now note that the Fourteenth Amendment may
contain some textual tools to tell us when the church should prevail
and when the state should. Consider two sincere religious practices.
In the first, a church would like to use sacramental wine in its worship
service despite a local dry law. In the second, the church would like to
allow its members to kill endangered species. The words of the First
Amendment cannot distinguish between these cases - if one is a sin-
cere "exercise" of religion, so is the other. But the words of the Four-
teenth are different. They speak of "privileges" and "immunities."
And perhaps these words would lend themselves to the following ap-
proach. If only co-religionists are involved (the wine case), a sincere
religious practice is suitably private, self-regarding, internal, "privi-
leged," and "immune" from state interference. But if a religious prac-
tice imposes a harm2 5 on nonbelievers (the endangered species case),
then a secular law should prevail. Other scholars have argued that
this textual account of the Fourteenth Amendment, or something like
it, draws support from the history of Reconstruction more generally.
28 6
In glossing the First Amendment, the framers of the Fourteenth had a
broader vision of free exercise as applicable even against some secular
laws, these scholars suggest. I shall not today attempt to offer any fi-
nal assessment of this tricky question. It suffices to say that the best
argument for religious exemptions lies here, in the Reconstruction, and
not in the Founding.
But who in the end should decide the meaning of Reconstruction
- Congress or the Supreme Court? The Congress, says the Congress
in RFRA. The Supreme Court, says the Supreme Court in Boerne.
284 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 231-57.
285 I am using "harm" here in the sense elaborated by John Stuart Mill and his followers.
286 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemp-
tions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. iio6 (1994).
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Who is right? This takes us to the relationship between Section i and
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the larger issues of sepa-
ration of powers and federalism implicated therein.
The words of Section 5 seem simple enough: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." Writing for the Boerne Court, Justice Kennedy approaches
these words in standard clause-bound fashion. To "enforce" Section i
means to provide remedies for violations of the rights guaranteed by
Section i (as the Supreme Court has independently interpreted those
rights):
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot
be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitu-
tional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to
enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no
longer be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment]."2 87
As standard clause-bound arguments go, this seems quite impressive at
first. On reflection, however, we can see how a pro-Congress critic
might see this passage as perfectly circular and exquisitely question-
begging. Congress believes it is not altering or changing the meaning
of free exercise - Smith wrongly altered the meaning and Congress is
restoring it, enforcing its true meaning. Why does the Court's view of
Smith's rightness trump Congress's view of its wrongness? Quick al-
lusions to Marbury do not easily answer the issue, for even under
Marbury other branches of the federal government are sometimes al-
lowed to have a broader view of a constitutional right, and to make
that broader view stick. (Courts upheld the vile Sedition Act of 1798,
but Jefferson deemed the Act unconstitutional and pardoned all con-
cerned.)
Standing alone, the words of Section 5 seem to support Justice
Kennedy, though not nearly so much as he thinks. But the words of
Section 5 do not stand alone. They are part of a single coherent Con-
stitution and must be read alongside the rest of the document. And
when they are, a strong - perhaps devastating - objection to Justice
Kennedy's overly confident assertions arises, an objection that he does
not see because he is reading with blinkers on. Here are the words of
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment: "Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." These words are in
pari materia with the words of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. A very powerful intratextual presumption arises that these two
parallel clauses must be interpreted in parallel fashion. What's sauce
for one should be sauce for the other. But Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment has not been read simply to allow Congress to remedy
287 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
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violations of Section i (of the Thirteenth). Acting under Section 2,
Congress has passed broad substantive legislation ranging far beyond
the self-executing rights under Section i (as defined by the Supreme
Court). No court ever said, or ever would say, that when private per-
son A refuses to deal commercially with private person B because B is
black, this refusal is "slavery" or "involuntary servitude" within the
meaning of Section i of the Thirteenth Amendment. And yet the
Court in the famous case of Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.28 8 upheld con-
gressional laws banning this refusal under its Section 2 enforcement
power.2
s9
The Boerne Court says that once Congress goes beyond remedial
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment Section i, Congress would
no longer be enforcing the Amendment "in any meaningful sense."290
If this is so for the Fourteenth, why not for the Thirteenth, too? Or to
be more blunt, as this is not true for the Thirteenth, why is it so for the
Fourteenth? The Boerne Court offers no answer to the obvious incon-
sistency here - it never even sees the issue. It is reading Section 5 of
the Fourteenth and does not even see Section 2 of the Thirteenth.
Perhaps a defender of the Court might say that to the extent that
Jones and Boerne are inconsistent, Jones should go. But the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment itself - the Thirty-Ninth Congress -
had a broad view of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. We
know this because they adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866,291 which
swept far beyond merely prohibiting slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, and the basis for their action was Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment. At the very moment that they were proposing another
"enforcement" clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, they were speak-
ing loud and clear about what the parallel enforcement clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment meant.2 92 And they said it meant more than
mere remedial legislation.
This noteworthy fact about the Thirty-Ninth Congress - which,
again, Justice Kennedy never notices because he never sees the freight
train coming - seems much stronger than the facts about that Con-
gress that he does mention. He stresses the fact that lawmakers re-
jected an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that in effect
28 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
289 See id. at 439.
290 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
291 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
292 Admittedly, Representative John Bingham, the father of Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not share his colleagues' broad view of Section 2 of the Thirteenth. (Or if he did,
he thought that even under a broad view, encompassing substantive and not merely remedial en-
forcement, Section 2 was still not broad enough to support the wide-ranging Civil Rights Bill.)
But on this issue Bingham was outvoted by two-thirds of his colleagues, who overrode President




would have given Congress plenary legislative power.29 3 But there is a
large gap between plenary power on one extreme and only remedial
power on the other. To reject the former is not to affirm the latter -
as is clear if we spend just an instant thinking about Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment, under which Congress has less than plenary
and more than remedial power. In the Thirteenth Amendment this
middle ground is captured by the concept of "badges and incidents"
294
of slavery, which Section i does not abolish of its own force, but which
can be abolished by Congress under Section 2.
Are there comparable middle-ground possibilities for the Four-
teenth Amendment? Here are a couple of obvious contenders. Con-
gress could have power to define rights that in good faith it considers
truly fundamental and basic, and these rights, once defined - "badges
and incidents of freedom and citizenship" - would thereafter be en-
forceable, even against states, as "privileges" and "immunities" of
American "citizens." A more modest position is that even if Congress
does not have this broad ontological power to make something a na-
tional privilege ipsofacto, surely it should have the epistemic power to
make known its views about what is truly fundamental, and have
those views treated as powerful evidence of fundamentality in courts.
Just as the Supreme Court looks to penal laws on the books to decide
what is cruel and unusual in our culture,295 so it could look to congres-
sional laws as evidence of what is truly fundamental in our culture.
Thus in a close case, the Court might in the absence of a congressional
declaration decide that a given right was not fundamental, but if Con-
gress were to weigh in on behalf of the right, the Court would consider
the issue afresh in light of this new evidence.2 96 The Boerne case it-
self, in which Congress sought to support a view of religious freedom
that several Justices themselves had embraced in Smith, might have
seemed an obvious candidate for such a respectful attitude toward the
only branch of the federal government mentioned in the Fourteenth
Amendment as its enforcer. But the Boerne Court would have none of
this.
The legislative history that Boerne invokes supports my middle-
ground positions. The early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was rejected because it in effect conferred plenary power on
Congress, read as follows:
293 See Boerne, 1i7 S. Ct. at 2164-66.
294 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
295 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-71, 373 (1989) (calling "the pattern of en-
acted laws" the "primary and most reliable indication of consensus").
296 For a powerful and elegant argument in support of this approach, see Michael W. McCon-




The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
297
The objection to this draft was twofold: Congress would have power
to legislate even in the absence of any state misconduct and even on
private parties (the state action issue), and would have power over vir-
tually everything, because everything implicates life, liberty, and prop-
erty. But note how the middle ground I am proposing avoids both
problems. First, it accepts the state action doctrine - Congress can
legislate rights against states, not private persons. Second, it further
limits Congress's power by focusing on privileges and immunities of
citizens, not life, liberty, and property. Life, liberty, and property en-
compass almost everything, but the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens that I am highlighting include only things that are in a real and
sincere sense deemed truly fundamental.
The rejected draft is also noteworthy for its intratextual echo of the
Article I, Section 8, Necessary and Proper Clause. This clause was as-
sociated with broad congressional power in McCulloch. It might be
thought that the abandonment of this language in the final version of
Section 5 signaled a retreat from a broad view of congressional en-
forcement authority. On the contrary, the framers saw the Enforce-
ment Clause phrase "appropriate legislation" as equivalent to the Arti-
cle I, Section 8 phrase "proper laws." Ordinary dictionaries confirm
the obvious etymological link between "proper" and "appropriate."29
And in one of McCulloch's most famous passages, Marshall cemented
this etymological linkage in words that the Thirty-Ninth Congress
knew and relied on: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. '299
Only a couple of years after the Fourteenth Amendment became part
of our supreme law, the Supreme Court itself quoted this famous pas-
sage in full and then declared that "[i]t must be taken then as finally
settled, so far as judicial decisions can settle anything, that the words"
297 CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 1034 (1866).
298 I THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 586 (2d ed. 1989).
299 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (18ig) (emphasis added). For clear
evidence that the 39th Congress had these key words from McCulloch in mind when they drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment, see CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 1118 (1866) (remarks of
Rep. James Wilson). Wilson was the House sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of x866, which he
defended under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Doubts about the sufficiency of this ba-
sis for congressional power eventually helped lead to congressional adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was (among other things) designed to provide a rock-solid foundation for the
Act. In this passage, Wilson defended the pending civil rights bill by quoting verbatim Section 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment and then explicitly linking its wording to the key words from
McCulloch (which Wilson also quoted verbatim).
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of the Necessary and Proper Clause were "equivalent" to the word
"appropriate."30 0 And here is what the Court said in the i88os, in lan-
guage prominently relied on in Jones, about the Enforcement Clause of
the Thirteenth Amendment: "[It] clothes Congress with power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States ....- 301
The Boerne Court's self-confident and self-aggrandizing attitude
about interpretive power under the Fourteenth Amendment is easy to
explain but hard to justify. Perhaps the Court sees itself as the font of
all constitutional wisdom and is offended by the audacity of lawmak-
ers who "criticized the Court's reasoning"30 2 in Smith and who at-
tacked it by name in a statute. 30 3 At one point the Court tellingly pro-
claims that "Congress' power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause
follows from our [the Court's] holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut.
'30 4
I might have thought that Congress's power followed from the Four-
teenth Amendment itself, which was merely interpreted (correctly, I
might add) in Cantwell. Overly exuberant statements of judicial su-
premacy are in vogue these days, but it is ironic to read all this back
into the Fourteenth Amendment, in which Congress (the good guys)
drafted emphatic constitutional language to repudiate the arrogant
Dred Scott Court (the bad guys). Congress did not insist on being the
only interpreter of fundamental rights. It was aware that it might one
day fall into the wrong hands, and so it created a self-executing Sec-
tion i that courts could enforce on their own. But courts can also at
times fall into the wrong hands, as the Thirty-Ninth Congress well
knew. Thus the most sensible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
would involve both courts and Congress in the task of protecting truly
fundamental rights against states, with states generally held to which-
ever standard was stricter -- more protective of fundamental freedoms
- in any given instance.
Boerne is yet one more illustration - my last today - of the ca-
pacity of intratextualism to highlight a certain kind of interpretive in-
consistency or self-promotion. But the value of the tool goes far be-
yond that. Its largest value lies, quite simply, in enabling us to squeeze
300 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 614-15 (1870).
301 The Civil Rights Cases, 1o9 U.S. 3, 20 (1883), cited in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 439 (1968).
302 City of Boerne v. Flores, 1i7 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (I997).
303 See supra p. 819.




more meaning from the document that inscribes our highest and most
popular law. Good interpreters need to know when and how to read
between the lines.
3 05
305 Those readers looking for a general concluding section in this Article will not find one. In-
tratextualism is one among many interpretive tools, and like all tools it must ultimately be judged
instrumentally. Does the tool work? Can the tool generate important, incisive, and illuminating
readings of the Constitution? With this tool, can we see more clearly deep truths about the
meaning of our Constitution? These questions are best answered by example rather than by a
priori reasoning. If my examples have failed to persuade readers of the power and elegance of
intratextualism, little more can be said. If, however, my examples have persuaded readers that a
small and simple tool can in fact generate large and rich insights across a broad range of ques-
tions, little more need be said.
